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TAKINGS, COMMUNITY, AND VALUE: 
REFORMING TAKINGS LAW TO FAIRLY 
COMPENSATE COMMON INTEREST COMMUNITIES 
 
Shai Stern* 
 
This Article argues that individuals who live in highly cooperative 
common interest communities should, in certain instances, be entitled to 
additional compensation or other remedies when their property is taken 
through eminent domain. The exclusive takings remedy of monetary 
compensation equal to the fair market value of the property cannot always 
account for loss of communality. This Article offers guidelines for allocation 
of additional remedies (monetary and in-kind) that recognize such loss. This 
proposal is grounded in a pluralistic conception of property, which holds 
that the state should support individuals’ use of property as a social 
instrument to fulfill diverse values and beliefs. To that end, the state should 
balance several factors to determine whether a member of a community, or a 
community as a whole, should be entitled to remedies for communal loss: (1) 
the size and scope of the taking within the community; (2) the role, if any, of 
the community’s cooperation in its members’ realization of a shared 
conception of the good; (3) the community’s social legitimacy as determined 
primarily by its structural openness, that is, its members’ ability to 
simultaneously belong to other communities; and (4) the community’s ability 
to self-rehabilitate as determined by its political and economic strength. The 
state should also consider these factors in determining which of several 
types of remedies for communality loss would be most appropriate.  
                                                            
* Faculty of Law, Bar Ilan University. I am grateful to Gregory S. Alexander, 
Elizabeth Anderson, Hanoch Dagan, Tsilli Dagan, Avital Margalit, Ayelet 
Shachar, Jeff Spinner-Halev, Joseph W. Singer and Laura S. Underkuffler on 
their perceptive comments and suggestions on earlier drafts, as well as to 
participants of the Tel Aviv University Law School Doctoral Colloquium (2013) 
and the “Human Rights and Judaism” workshop at the Israel Democracy 
Institute (2013).  
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Recent decades have witnessed increases in cultural diversity, 
social polarization, and residential segregation, all of which have 
altered the forms and functions of property ownership in the 
United States.1 One prominent expression of these changes is the 
growth of residential common interest communities (CICs) 
(alternatively called common interest developments) as a dominant 
form of housing in many metropolitan areas. These developments 
are characterized by at least a certain degree of cooperation among 
members. With more than 323,000 common interest communities 
housing 63.4 million residents in the United States,2 it is no 
wonder that they have attracted so much attention from legal 
scholars.3 Much of the research focuses on these communities’ 
internal governance regimes4 and these regimes’ externalities.5 
                                                            
1 Michael Pacione, Proprietary Residential Communities in the United 
States, 96 GEOGRAPHICAL REV. 543, 543 (2006). 
2 See Industry Data, CMTY. ASS’NS INST., http://www.caionline. 
org/about/facts.cfm (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
3 See Patrick J. Rohan, Preparing Community Associations for the 
Twenty-First Century: Anticipating the Legal Problems and Possible Solutions, 
73 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 3, 5–6 (1999) (“Whether one focuses on the housing 
pattern in large cities or upon suburbia, one is led inexorably to the conclusion 
that the age of community association living, as opposed to renting or owning a 
one-family home, is upon us. The rental market in every urban center is rapidly 
disappearing as high-rise buildings are torn down, devoted to commercial uses, 
or converted into condominium or cooperative housing.”). 
4 See, e.g., WAYNE S. HYATT, CONDOMINIUM AND HOMEOWNERS 
ASSOCIATION PRACTICE: COMMUNITY ASSOCIATION LAW (2d ed. 1988); 
Armand Arabian, Condos, Cats, and CC&Rs: Invasion of the Castle Common, 
23 PEPP. L. REV. 1 (1995); Mark Fenster, Community by Covenant, Process, and 
Design: Cohousing and the Contemporary Common Interest Community, 15 J. 
LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 3 (1999); Susan F. French, Making Common Interest 
Communities Work: The Next Step, 37 URB. LAW. 359 (2005); Norman Geis, 
Beyond the Condominium: The Uniform Common-Interest Ownership Act, 17 
REAL PROP PROB. & TR. J. 757 (1982); Wayne S. Hyatt, Common Interest 
Communities: Evolution and Reinvention, 31 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 303 (1997); 
Evan McKenzie, Common-Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow, 
14 HOUSING POL’Y DEBATE 203 (2003) [hereinafter McKenzie, Common-
Interest Housing]; Evan McKenzie, Reinventing Common Interest 
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This Article focuses on another property law issue that this 
growing phenomenon raises, which has so far been neglected in 
the literature: the intersection of takings law and CICs. Monetary 
compensation equal to the fair market value of the property is 
typically the exclusive remedy for individuals when the 
government takes their property through eminent domain.6 In most 
circumstances, this compensation is fair and sufficient. Yet, for 
many individuals who reside in highly cooperative CICs, market 
value compensation hardly places them in the same position they 
would have been in had their property not been taken. This is 
because the loss of the property also damages the community in 
and of itself.  
This Article therefore argues that, in certain instances, 
individuals and even communities as a whole should be entitled to 
additional remedies for loss of communality. Mere membership in 
a CIC, however, is not necessarily a reliable indicator of communal 
loss. CICs vary greatly in purpose and level of cooperation, 
ranging from hyper-individualist to ultra-collectivist.7 
                                                            
Developments: Reflections on a Policy Role for the Judiciary, 31 J. MARSHALL 
L. REV. 397 (1997) [hereinafter McKenzie, Common Interest Developments]. 
5 See, e.g., NAN ELLIN, ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR (1997); Gregory S. 
Alexander, Dilemmas of Group Autonomy: Residential Associations and 
Community, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 1 (1989); Sheryll D. Cashin, Privatized 
Communities and the “Secession of the Successful”: Democracy and Fairness 
Beyond the Gate, 28 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1675 (2000); Paula A. Franzese, 
Privatization and Its Discontents: Common Interest Communities and the Rise 
of Government for “the Nice”, 37 URB. LAW. 335 (2005); Amnon Lehavi, 
Mixing Property, 38 SETON HALL L. REV. 137 (2008); Stephanie M. Stern, The 
Dark Side of Town: The Social Capital Revolution in Residential Property Law, 
99 VA. L. REV. 811 (2013).  
6 U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”); United States v. Reynolds, 397 U.S. 14, 16 
(1970) (“The Fifth Amendment provides that private property shall not be taken 
for public use without just compensation. And ‘just compensation’ means the 
full monetary equivalent of the property taken. The owner is to be put in the 
same position monetarily as he would have occupied if his property had not 
been taken. In enforcing the constitutional mandate, the Court at an early date 
adopted the concept of market value: the owner is entitled to the fair market 
value of the property at the time of the taking.”). 
7 Alexander, supra note 5, at 3–4. 
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Furthermore, while the law recognizes several forms of CICs, the 
actual differences among them do not always correspond to these 
legal distinctions. Takings law should reflect true differences in 
communality. While the sole remedy of market value payment may 
provide adequate compensation for members of individualistic 
communities, it may not do so for members of communities 
characterized by a greater degree of cooperation. This Article 
argues that, insofar as we conceive of these communities as 
legitimate, we should design our legal rules to allow them to 
function properly.8 
The issue of how takings law should treat CICs relates to an 
ongoing debate about the role of community and cooperation in 
property. As I demonstrate below, none of the most popular 
conceptions of property support differential treatment of CICs in 
takings law. This is because these conceptions are all structured 
around a single, all-encompassing meaning of “community” that 
fails to recognize important differences between CICs and other 
residential configurations, as well as differences among various 
kinds of CICs. A different conception is therefore necessary. 
Drawing on Elizabeth Anderson’s conception of foundational 
value pluralism,9 this Article argues that a differential treatment of 
CICs in takings law is indeed normatively justified, and can be 
grounded in a pluralistic conception of property. A foundational 
pluralistic conception of property holds that property should be 
viewed as a social instrument, which different individuals can use 
to fulfill their basic values and beliefs.10 This understanding turns 
                                                            
8 HANOCH DAGAN, PROPERTY: VALUES AND INSTITUTIONS 106 (2011). 
9 Foundational pluralism is the view that “there are plural values at the 
most basic level—that is to say, there is no one value that subsumes all other 
values, no one property of goodness, and no overarching principle of action.” 
See Elinor Mason, Value Pluralism, in STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF 
PHILOSOPHY (first published June 20, 2006; substantive revision July 29, 2011), 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/value-pluralism/#FouNorPlu.       Elizabeth 
Anderson embraces the foundational pluralistic view and argues that “people 
experience the world as infused with many different values.” ELIZABETH 
ANDERSON, VALUE IN ETHICS AND ECONOMICS 1, 149 (1995). The state, 
according to Anderson, should accommodate its institutions to social diversity, 
allowing each person to live according to his or her values and beliefs. See id. 
10 Gregory S. Alexander, Pluralism and Property, 80 FORDHAM L. 
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property into a locus of competing values, which justifies different 
legal arrangements tailored to specific communities. Many 
individuals seek to fulfill their notion of the good by residing in a 
particular community where they cooperate with others who share 
those same values.11 This Article proposes guidelines for 
reforming takings law’s compensation scheme to include 
additional monetary and in-kind remedies for communal loss that 
CIC members may incur when the government takes their 
property. Policymakers should balance several factors in 
determining the proper remedy when the government takes 
property from a CIC. 
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I illustrates the great 
extent to which CICs may differ in their underlying values and the 
nature and extent of cooperation among their members. It explains 
how the existing takings remedy scheme uniquely harms highly 
cooperative CICs at both the individual and the community level. 
This Part also explains why, despite the normative appeal of 
distinguishing among CICs in takings law, current law poses a 
practical barrier to such a policy. Part II proposes guidelines for 
implementing a new takings remedy scheme. It argues that three 
factors are important in determining whether, and to what extent, a 
community, or individual within a community, should be entitled 
to additional remedies in the face of expropriation. Those factors 
are: (1) the role, if any, of the community’s cooperation in its 
members’ realization of a shared conception of the good; (2) the 
community’s social legitimacy as determined primarily by its 
structural openness, that is, its members’ ability to simultaneously 
belong to other communities; and (3) the community’s political 
and economic strength. Part III introduces additional takings 
remedies and discusses how the interplay of the three factors 
discussed in Part II should affect the selection of a remedy (or 
remedies) for a given taking. Finally, Part IV addresses three main 
                                                            
REV. 1017, 1036 (2011).  
11 For the purposes of this article, John Rawls’s definition of a conception 
of the good may be best. According to Rawls, a definition of the good should 
consist “of a more or less determined scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want 
to realize for their own sake.” JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM: EXPANDED 
EDITION 19 (2011). 
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arguments against deviating from market value compensation in 
certain circumstances: (1) the subjective nature of communal loss; 
(2) heightened commodification effects; and (3) the undermining 
of state neutrality; and concludes that these objections do not 
significantly weaken the case for recognizing loss of communality 
in the law of takings.  
 
I. ONE SIZE DOES NOT FIT ALL: VARIATION AMONG COMMON 
INTEREST COMMUNITIES 
 
CICs may differ in their underlying values as well as in their 
nature and the extent of cooperation among their members. The 
current takings remedy scheme uniquely harms highly cooperative 
CICs at the level of both the individual and the community at 
large. This Part explains why, despite the normative appeal of 
distinguishing among CICs in takings law, current law poses a 
practical barrier to the establishment of such a policy. 
 
A.  Common Interest Communities and the Law  
 
Common interest communities take numerous forms, but the 
three12 most common are: (1) condominiums, in which every unit 
                                                            
12 A fourth legal framework for community formation is through state 
legislation that enables groups of property owners to incorporate as highly 
autonomous local communities. This legal framework allows the operation of 
one of the most controversial communities in the U.S., namely, the Satmar 
Hasidic community of Kiryas Joel, New York. The Supreme Court criticized 
this framework, but did not invalidate it. See Bd. of Educ. of Kiryas Joel Vill. 
Sch. Dist. v. Grumet, 512 U.S. 687, 712 (1994) (“Fortunately for the Satmars, 
New York state law had a way of accommodating their concerns. New York 
allows virtually any group of residents to incorporate their own village, with 
broad powers of self-government. The Satmars followed this course, 
incorporating their community as the village of Kiryas Joel, and their zoning 
problems, at least, were solved.”); see also Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, The 
Puzzling Persistence of Community: The Cases of Airmont and Kiryas Joel, in 
FROM GHETTO TO EMANCIPATION: HISTORICAL AND CONTEMPORARY 
RECONSIDERATIONS OF THE JEWISH COMMUNITY 75 (David N. Myers & 
William V. Rowe eds., 1997). For the exercising of this legal framework by 
other communities as well, see Mark D. Rosen, The Outer Limits of Community 
Self-Governance in Residential Associations Municipalities and Indian Country: 
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is owned in fee simple by a particular owner, while the common 
areas are owned by all unit owners jointly;13 (2) homeowners 
associations, in which individual homeowners within a housing 
subdivision become members of an association that owns the 
common property;14 and (3) housing cooperatives, in which a 
cooperative housing corporation owns all of the real property and 
issues stock and proprietary leases to tenant-stockholders.15  
The law has played an important role in allowing CICs to 
flourish.16 Since the New York Court of Appeals’ 1938 decision in 
Neponsit Prop. Owners’ Ass’n v. Emigrant Industrial Savings 
Bank,17 courts across the United States have developed a legal 
framework that enables CICs to function.18 The framework 
established in Neponsit—which several uniform laws19 and the 
                                                            
A Liberal Theory, 84 VA. L. REV. 1053, 1082–86 (1998). 
13 JOSEPH W. SINGER, PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES 
825 (1997); HYATT, supra note 4, at 13–14; Geis, supra note 4, at 760–61. 
14 HYATT, supra note 4, at 204–05; Geis, supra note 4, at 765. 
15 PATRICK J. ROHAN & MELVIN A. RESKIN, COOPERATIVE HOUSING LAW 
AND PRACTICE § 9.01, .02 (1998) (setting forth the governing structure of 
residential cooperatives); HYATT, supra note 4, at 21; SINGER, supra note 13, at 
826; Fenster, supra note 4, at 19; Geis, supra note 4, at 760; Phillip N. Smith, 
Comment, A Survey of the Legal Aspects of Cooperative Apartment Ownership, 
16 U. MIAMI L. REV. 305, 305–17 (1961) (outlining various species of 
residential cooperatives’ structures). 
16 For the historical and jurisprudential foundations of common interest 
developments, see Sharmeen C. Bamarni, Note, Residential Associations and 
the Concept of Consensual Governance, 9 GEO. MASON L. REV. 91, 92 (1986) 
and Todd Brower, Communities within the Community: Consent, 
Constitutionalism, and other Failures of Legal Theory in Residential 
Associations, 7 J. LAND USE & ENVTL. L. 203, 208–16 (1992). 
17 15 N.E.2d 793 (N.Y. 1938). 
18 See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 
1290 (Cal. 1994); Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 So. 2d 637 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1981); Perry v. Bridgetown Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1230, 
1233 (Miss. 1986).  
19 The Uniform Condominium Act project led to three other related acts: 
MODEL REAL ESTATE COOPERATION ACT, 7B U.L.A. 225 (1981), UNIF. 
PLANNED CMTY ACT, 7B U.L.A. 1 (1980), and UNIF. COMMON INTEREST 
OWNERSHIP ACT, 7 U.L.A. 231 (1982), superseded by 7 U.L.A. 171 (1994 & 
Supp. 1995). 
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Restatement of Property embrace20—consists of a web of 
servitudes that ties certain rights and obligations to property 
ownership.21 No owner in a CIC can unilaterally terminate 
servitudes burdening the property or transfer the property free of 
such servitudes without the consent of other beneficiaries.22 
Practically, most CICs are established through documents that set 
forth the web of obligations imposed on the members. These 
documents are typically comprised of “declarations” containing a 
set of conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs),23 which 
primarily regulate the governing framework of the development, 
but also impose restrictions on the development’s members’ use of 
private property.24 These restrictions significantly constrain 
individuals’ use of their property.25  
                                                            
20 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6 (2000). 
21 Id. at intro. note (“Servitudes underlie all common-interest 
communities, regardless of the ownership and organizational forms used. They 
provide the mechanism by which the obligations to share financial responsibility 
for common property and services and to submit to the management and 
enforcement powers of the community association are imposed on present and 
future owners of the property in the community.”). 
22 See Cullen v. Tarini, 15 A.3d 968 (R.I. 2011) (holding that an 
injunction can be granted to stop an owner from deliberately and knowingly 
violating a restrictive covenant). 
23 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 6 (2000) 
(“‘Declaration’ means the recorded document or documents containing the 
servitudes that create and govern the common-interest community.”); id. § 6.2.6 
(“‘Governing documents’ means the declaration and other documents, such as 
the articles of incorporation or articles of association, bylaws, and rules and 
regulations, that govern the operation of a common-interest association, or 
determine the rights and obligations of the members of the common-interest 
community.”). 
24 See, e.g., Franzese, supra note 5, at 336–37 (“Covenants have been 
devised to regulate everything from whether pets are permitted, what the 
maximum weight of an allowed pet must be, the permissibility and, if permitted, 
the design of one’s doghouse and birdhouse, the precise contours of landscaping 
content and style, the architectural style of one’s home, the color of one’s home, 
the color of one’s shutters, the color of one’s interior drapes, the permissibility 
of screen doors, the posting of signs, and even the propriety of wok-cooking.”). 
25 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES intro. note (2000). See 
also Arabian, supra note 4, at 1–4; Franzese, supra note 5, at 336–37; Paula A. 
Franzese, Common Interest Communities: Standards of Review and Review of 
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American property law is generally deferential to the 
obligations that CC&Rs impose on property owners. Except when 
CC&Rs clash directly with other laws,26 judicial intervention in an 
association’s enforcement of its CC&Rs is usually limited to 
applying a reasonableness standard.27 In this way, property law 
recognizes distinctions among different forms of property 
ownership.28 Unlike fee simple ownership, ownership within a CIC 
may be subject to restrictions that other owners impose. The law’s 
recognition and acceptance of this distinction led property scholar 
                                                            
Standards, 3 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 663, 771–75 (2000). 
26 Courts tend to distinguish between regulations appearing in the original 
documents, which will not be invalidated unless they are wholly arbitrary or 
when they violate public policy or fundamental constitutional rights, and those 
put into effect by the board of directors, which are subject to a more stringent 
standard of reasonableness. See, e.g., Hidden Harbour Estates, Inc. v. Basso, 393 
So. 2d 637, 639–40 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981) (“Such restrictions are very much 
in the nature of covenants running with the land and they will not be invalidated 
absent a showing that they are wholly arbitrary in their application, in violation 
of public policy, or that they abrogate some fundamental constitutional right.”). 
See also Arabian, supra note 4, at 12–13; Franzese, supra note 25, at 685–93. 
27 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF PROP.: SERVITUDES § 3.1 (2000) (“A 
servitude created as provided in Chapter 2 is valid unless it is illegal or 
unconstitutional or violates public policy.”); id. § 6.7 (“Except as limited by 
statute or the governing documents, a common-interest community has an 
implied power to adopt reasonable rules to: (a) govern the use of the common 
property, and (b) govern the use of individually owned property to protect the 
common property.”). See also Seagate Condo. Ass’n v. Duffy, 330 So. 2d 484, 
486 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1976) (“The test which our courts have adopted and 
applied with respect to restraints on alienation and use is reasonableness.”); 
Holiday Out in America at St. Lucie, Inc. v. Bowes, 285 So. 2d 63, 66 (Fla. Dist. 
Ct. App. 1973) (Mager, J., dissenting) (“The individual condominium unit 
owner should be permitted to freely alienate or use his condominium property 
subject to the reasonable limitations imposed by condominium ownership and as 
otherwise allowable by law.”). 
28 See Perry v. Bridgetown Cmty. Ass’n, Inc., 486 So. 2d 1230, 1233 
(Miss. 1986) (“More recently, however, our society has become more complex, 
and land use has become more diversified. The more populous areas use land 
not only for single or multiple residences in subdivision developments, but for 
new arrangements of homeowners associations and planned unit developments. 
The latter have given rise to a new body of law. This Court is called upon to 
address the unique roles and functions in the special relationship of the 
homeowner, the association, and third parties that deal with the association.”). 
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Gregory Alexander to state that courts regard CICs “as new forms 
of residency, fundamentally different from both traditional fee 
ownership of the detached house and apartment living.”29 These 
new forms of ownership, which subordinate an individual’s 
property rights to the collective judgment of the owners 
association, “comprise the chief attributes of owning property in a 
common interest development.”30 
Notwithstanding the above, takings law has not evolved with 
the rapid growth of CICs. While CICs vary greatly in their 
purposes and levels of cooperation, takings law offers only one 
remedy—fair market value monetary compensation—to an owner 
whose property is condemned through eminent domain, whether he 
owns a house in fee simple, a condominium, or a share in a highly 
communal housing cooperative.31  
This “one-size-fits-all” policy is problematic insofar as we 
conceive of property as a pluralistic institution, through which 
owners may express different values. The theoretical debate over 
property’s characteristics is the subject of an enormous amount of 
literature and therefore goes far beyond the scope of this Article. 
Nevertheless, in order to explain the incompatibility of takings 
law’s “one-size-fits-all” policy with the wide range of CICs, it is 
sufficient to recognize the contributions of several property 
scholars who have highlighted the importance of the ways in which 
communities facilitate the expression of human values through 
property ownership. For example, from a law and economics 
perspective, Gideon Parchomovsky and Peter Siegelman argue that 
takings should be compensated differently for certain residential 
communities because of the additional loss of communality.32 
Gregory Alexander and Eduardo Peñalver developed another, more 
robust conception of community in the context of property 
                                                            
29 Alexander, supra note 5, at 11. 
30 Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 1282 (Cal. 
1994). 
31 See supra note 4 and accompanying sources.  
32 Gideon Parchomovsky & Peter Siegelman, Selling Mayberry: 
Communities and Individuals in Law and Economics, 92 CALIF. L. REV. 75, 136 
(2004). 
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ownership.33 According to Alexander and Peñalver, “[t]he 
communities in which we find ourselves play crucial roles in the 
formation of our preferences, the extent of our expectations and the 
scope of our aspirations”34 and therefore, owners should be under 
an obligation to “participate in and support the social networks and 
structures that enable us to develop those human capabilities that 
make human flourishing possible.”35 Joseph Singer argues for 
increased obligations of owners toward society (or the community) 
in which they live,36 while Hanoch Dagan suggests a 
comprehensive liberal conception of property, in which the 
government must consider community when establishing property 
institutions.37 
Although each of these scholars subscribes to a different school 
of thought, they all recognize the pluralistic nature of property. 
More concretely, they recognize conceptions of property that 
permit the consideration of personal values. Elizabeth Anderson’s 
pluralistic theory takes this understanding a step further. Anderson 
argues that since “people experience the world as infused with 
many different values,” the state should be obligated to allow all 
people to live by their values through establishment of diverse 
social institutions that people can use to promote these values.38 
Anderson therefore argues that the state should be obligated to 
“expand the range of significant opportunities open to its citizens 
by supporting institutions that enable them to govern themselves 
by the norms internal to the modes of valuation appropriate to 
different kinds of good.”39 
Applying Anderson’s insights to takings law, the state should 
be required not only to allow people to live in accordance with 
                                                            
33 Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver, Properties of 
Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 127, 134 (2008). 
34 Id. at 140.  
35 Id. at 143. 
36 JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, ENTITLEMENT: THE PARADOXES OF 
PROPERTY (2001); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER, THE EDGES OF THE FIELD: LESSONS 
ON THE OBLIGATIONS OF OWNERSHIP (2001). 
37 DAGAN, supra note 8, at xvii. 
38 ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 1, 149. 
39 Id.  
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their values and beliefs, but also to provide them with the practical 
possibility of doing so.40 This pluralistic obligation, as set out 
below, should guide us in determining the proper treatment of 
residential communities in takings law. In particular, the state’s 
pluralistic obligation justifies expanding the range of takings 
compensation mechanisms and remedies. In view of the state’s 
pluralistic obligation, the current remedy scheme in takings law is 
problematic for two overarching reasons: 1) it leads to 
discriminatory outcomes and 2) it prevents the growth of highly 
cooperative CICs. 
First, the one-size-fits-all approach actually leads to 
discriminatory outcomes by violating the property rights of certain 
members of CICs. This is because it fails to recognize the harm 
caused by what Parchomovsky and Siegelman term “loss of 
communality,” which represents the loss of interpersonal ties that 
“are not fully captured by the market value of the properties.”41 
Individuals who are displaced from their communities due to 
eminent domain proceedings may no longer be able to realize a 
conception of the good that depends on cooperation with other 
community members. Consider a member of a religious 
community who—to comply with his religious conception of the 
good—is required to cooperate with others who hold the same 
religious beliefs. When this person’s property is taken, he may lose 
not only land or a physical dwelling, but also his ability to 
cooperate with fellow community members to realize a shared 
                                                            
40 As will be demonstrated in Part III below, this obligation is primarily in 
place to ensure citizens’ ability to realize and maintain their conceptions of the 
good. Therefore, in the case of communities, the state may be obligated to not 
only provide a one-time monetary compensation for expropriation, but assist 
with a community’s resettlement. And in cases where the community’s 
conception of the good is not threatened (since the expropriation does not uproot 
the entire community, for example), this obligation may still require the state, in 
some instances, to pay the individual property owner who loses her individual 
ability to cooperate with others additional compensation. In this sense, the 
state’s pluralistic obligation has two dimensions: a collective one (in cases 
where the realization of community members’ shared conception of the good is 
threatened) and an individualistic one (where an individual is no longer able to 
cooperate with her community to realize her conception of the good).  
41 Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 136. 
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conception of the good. Compensation that merely provides him 
with a payment equal to the market value of the confiscated 
property ignores this type of loss. Moreover, individuals often 
submit to significant restrictions on their individual rights in order 
to live in these communities, which makes the failure to recognize 
loss of communality even more acute.  
Second, because of the way in which takings (in particular, 
large-scale takings) can tear apart a community’s social fabric, 
they are especially harmful to the ability of more cooperative CICs 
to flourish. Due to the absence of remedies for communal harm, 
these communities’ ability to continue functioning post-
expropriation is jeopardized. Thus the current takings scheme 
harms cooperative communities more than individualistic ones 
(which by nature do not suffer the same extent of communal harm, 
and whose members may be made whole through market value 
compensation). Even among cooperative communities, some are 
harmed more than others depending on how central cooperation is 
to the community’s functioning and its members’ realization of a 
shared co nception of the good.42 These consequences are 
unjustifiable to the extent we accept these communities as 
legitimate. 
 
B. The Problem of Measuring a CIC’s Level of 
Communality 
 
A CIC’s legal form is a poor proxy for its actual nature. 
Current property law is devoid of legal structures that relate to the 
characteristics of CICs. This may be explained by the state’s desire 
to maintain neutrality with respect to an owner’s choice of 
residential arrangement. This neutrality, however, prevents us from 
using a CIC’s legal structure to assess whether it or its members 
should be compensated differently. While all CICs are 
characterized by some degree of cooperation, the structure of the 
CIC does not—in and of itself—reveal much about the communal 
or individualistic nature of the community. Consider the following 
three CICs, all of which operate as residential cooperatives. 
                                                            
42 For a discussion of the different roles of cooperation in a community’s 
members’ realization of a shared conception of the good, see infra Part II. 
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1. The Ritz Tower, New York, NY 
 
The Ritz Tower (hereinafter The Ritz) was built in Manhattan 
in 1925 as an elegant apartment hotel.43 In 1952, after a bank took 
over the property due to discontinued mortgage payments, the 
Sonnabend hotel chain bought the Ritz and converted the building 
into a housing cooperative.44 The Ritz cooperative is operated in 
accordance with its enumerated bylaws, and the board of directors 
publishes, from time to time, various guidelines and notices that 
bind all shareholders.45 The Ritz does not attempt to establish a 
tightly bound community of residents. Rather, it offers its residents 
“the privacy and security of a truly luxury residence.”46 And yet, it 
is incorporated as a residential cooperative.  
 
2. Acorn Community, Mineral, VA 
 
Acorn Community is a secular, egalitarian community that was 
founded in Virginia in 1993. It is “committed to income-sharing, 
sustainable living, and creating a vibrant, eclectic culture.”47 In 
Acorn, the members live on the same plot of land and manage the 
community’s seed business together.48 According to Acorn’s 
mission statement, the community members are expected to share 
their “land, labor, income, and other resources equally or according 
to need.”49 Another one of Acorn’s main goals is to keep its 
                                                            
43 See VIRGINIA KURSHAN, NEW YORK CITY LANDMARKS PRESERVATION 
COMMISSION, Landmarks Commission Report (Oct. 29, 2002), available at 
http://www.theritztower.com/unprotected/pdf/ritztower-landmark.pdf. 
44 Id. at 7. 
45 See, e.g., Notice from Ritz Tower Board of Directors to Shareholders 
(Oct. 26, 2010), available at http://www.theritztower.com/unprotected/ 
pdf/alteration-agreement.pdf; Ritz Tower, Apartment Decoration Agreement 
(July 2010), available at http://www.theritztower.com/unprotected/ 
pdf/decorating-agreement.pdf. 
46 See RITZ TOWER, http://www.theritztower.com/about-amenities.htm 
(last visited Sept. 19, 2014). 
47 About Us, ACORN COMMUNITY, http://www.acorncommunity.org/ (last 
visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
48 Id. 
49 A.C.O.R.N., ECOVILLAGE CHARLOTTESVILLE, http://www. 
156 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
members safe from violence and threats. The community 
“encourages personal responsibility, supports queer and alternative 
lifestyles, and strives to create a stimulating social, political, 
feminist, and intellectual environment.”50 Community members 
meet twice a week in order to discuss community issues and check 
in with each other.51 Decisions in Acorn Community are made by 
formal consensus.52 Legally, Acorn is the same as the Ritz—a 
residential cooperative. 
 
3. Woodcrest, Rifton, NY 
 
The Woodcrest is a community founded by the Bruderhof—an 
international communal movement that seeks to “put into action 
Christ’s command to love God and neighbor.”53 Woodcrest, the 
first Bruderhof community in the United States, opened in 1954 on 
a property near the Walkill River in Rifton, New York.54 As part of 
the Bruderhof movement, Woodcrest members believe that 
community life gives them daily opportunities to put their beliefs 
into action.55 The community members take lifetime vows of 
obedience and poverty. Anyone who wishes to become a member 
of any Bruderhof community gives away his or her personal 
property before joining, and “contributes his or her talents to stand 
on an equal footing with all brothers and sisters.”56 The Bruderhof 
communities ascribe great importance to the institution of family 
and regard marriage as a “lifelong, sacred commitment between 
one man and one woman.”57 “Parents have the primary 
                                                            
greaterstonehenge.org/author/lgadmin/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
50 Acorn Community, FELLOWSHIP FOR INTENTIONAL COMMUNITY, 
http://directory.ic.org/1933/Acorn_Community (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
51 About Us, supra note 47.  
52 Id. 
53 BRUDERHOF, http://www.bruderhof.com/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
54 YAACOV OVED, THE WITNESS OF THE BROTHERS: A HISTORY OF THE 
BRUDERHOF 180–85 (Anthony Berris trans., Transaction Publishers) (2013).   
55 BRUDERHOF, supra note 53.  
56 Id. 
57 OVED, supra note 54, at 51 (“We keep strict discipline in our family 
life. Family does not suffer from the communal life, on the contrary; the joy of a 
married couple in each other and in their children is especially strong and 
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responsibility to raise their children, although the community 
provides childcare and schooling from an early age.”58 Yet, the 
Woodcrest is legally a residential cooperative, just like the Ritz 
and Acorn. 
These three communities illustrate the broad range of interests 
and objectives that CICs pursue. They also demonstrate the form-
substance gap that characterizes CICs. The individualistic and 
exclusive character of the Ritz contrasts starkly with the strong 
communal characteristics of the Acorn Community and the holistic 
spiritual worldview that binds members of Woodcrest together. 
Likewise, the secular nature of Acorn Community is at odds with 
Woodcrest’s deeply religious foundation.  
Despite these substantive differences—some of which go to the 
root of each CIC’s existence—each community is free to establish 
itself as either a homeowners’ association, condominium, or 
cooperative. These three types of developments are in some ways 
distinct.59 The internal governance of these developments might be 
influenced by their different financial structures,60 but they all 
                                                            
deep.”). 
58 BRUDERHOF, supra note 53. 
59 See McKenzie, Common-Interest Housing, supra note 4, at 205 (“There 
are also significant differences among the three types of CIDs. Condominium 
developments are typically multifamily construction resembling one or more 
apartment or townhouse buildings. Each home buyer acquires ownership of an 
individual unit, consisting of the airspace within the walls, coupled with a 
fractional interest in the ownership of the entire building. The condominium 
association manages and maintains the building. Cooperatives give each owner a 
share interest in the building or buildings, along with the exclusive right to 
occupy a particular unit. The cooperative association often has the right to 
approve the sale of units and may interview prospective owners before granting 
them the right to purchase. Planned communities may include mixes of housing 
types but typically feature detached single-family homes with their own lawns 
and driveways, along with common areas such as private streets; recreation 
facilities such as golf courses, swimming pools, and lakes; and other facilities 
such as sewer and drainage systems, and parking areas. In such developments, 
the purchaser acquires ownership of one of the homes, as well as an interest in 
the association that owns and maintains the common areas.”). 
60 See Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu & Jonathan Miller, The 
Condominium Versus Cooperative Puzzle: An Empirical Analysis of Housing in 
New York City, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 275, 281 (2007). 
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share a prominent feature: the governing body has wide leeway to 
shape and restrict members’ property rights.61 While the choice of 
legal form affects the scope of private ownership, it does not reveal 
much about the characteristics of the community. The legal 
structures do not dictate the form of cooperation in which members 
must engage. Instead, each one may accommodate forms of 
cooperation that vary in purpose and scope. 
As discussed, CICs take numerous forms, with condominiums, 
homeowners associations and housing cooperatives being the most 
prevalent. A decision to purchase property in any CIC is likely to 
subject the purchaser to a set of obligations toward other members 
and the association, which may shape the contours of the owner’s 
property rights in different ways.62 However, none of the 
recognized forms of CICs have inherent sets of obligations.63 
                                                            
61 See, e.g., Nahrstedt v. Lakeside Vill. Condo. Ass’n, 878 P.2d 1275, 
1282 (Cal. 1994) (“[S]ubordination of individual property rights to the collective 
judgment of the owners association together with restrictions on the use of real 
property comprise the chief attributes of owning property in a common interest 
development.”); Brower, supra note 16, at 211 (“[R]egardless of the legal form 
of the residential association, the associations govern their residents by private 
law mechanisms premised on a contractual, bargain-based paradigm, such as 
covenants, equitable servitudes, corporate by-laws and charters, and trust 
declarations.”); Schill et al., supra note 60, at 281 (“Both condominium 
associations and cooperative corporations enact rules that govern the behavior of 
their residents.”). 
62 See Brower, supra note 16, at 210–11. 
63 Michael H. Schill, Ioan Voicu, and Jonathan Miller argue the opposite, 
at least in regard to cooperatives and condominiums: “[U]nlike the case of 
cooperative apartments, condominium owners do not effectively share liability 
on mortgage debt, they are free to transfer their apartments to whomever they 
choose, they are subject to fewer rules than cooperative apartment owners and, 
correspondingly, they need spend less time in internal governance.” Schill et al, 
supra  note 60, at 276. However, while differences in financial governance may 
affect the scope of owners’ property rights, such differences are not the result of 
any legal requirements. Thus, even though they claim that cooperatives have a 
stricter regime for the alienation of property, the alienation of property in 
condominiums may also be contingent upon the approval of the admissions 
committee or other conditions laid out in the CC&Rs. Id. at 313. See also 
Brower, supra note 16, at 210 (arguing that the form of residential property 
ownership is of minimal importance); Jonathan D. Ross-Harrington, Property 
Forms in Tension: Preference Inefficiency, Rent-Seeking, and the Problem of 
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Considered in isolation, an individual’s choice of a condominium, 
homeowners association, or housing cooperative tells us little 
about the contours of her property rights or obligations to the 
community.  
The Ritz example may best illustrate this problem. The Ritz, as 
mentioned, is a residential cooperative. While cooperatives have 
long been recognized as a means of providing affordable 
housing,64 the Ritz proves that they are used for other purposes as 
well. Among the types of CICs mentioned above, cooperatives are 
often seen as the most collaborative.65 And yet, cooperation among 
residents of the Ritz does not run any deeper than sharing 
operating costs and respecting each other’s use and enjoyment of 
their living spaces and common amenities. The Ritz residents do 
not share a deep or collective conception of the good—they do not 
live together for the purpose of realizing certain fundamental 
values. Indeed, many of the Ritz’s residents probably do not even 
know each other.  
The use of the legal structure of a cooperative, therefore, 
carries little, if any, substantive meaning. The choice of a certain 
type of CIC does not necessarily imply anything about the extent 
of the cooperation, its purposes or its degree of importance for 
members of the CIC. While the law offers property owners a 
                                                            
Notice in the Modern Condominium, 28 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 187, 192 (2009) 
(“Condominiums, like all common-interest communities, are distinguished by 
their complex system of servitudes and the governance structure designed to 
amend and enforce the applicable covenants. Condominiums are governed by an 
association, membership in which is a mandatory condition of purchasing a unit 
in the condominium community. Unlike a single-family homeowner who 
exercises complete control over her real property, owners in a condominium are 
subject in many respects to the collective will of the association. Condominium 
associations have the power to assess fees, set restrictions on the use and 
enjoyment of property, and enforce community rules and standards.”). 
64 See Gerald W. Sazama, Lessons from the History of Affordable Housing 
Cooperatives in the United States: A Case Study in American Affordable 
Housing Policy, 59 AM. J. ECON. & SOC. 573, 573–74 (2000). 
65 See SINGER, supra note 13, at 826; Fenster, supra note 4, at 21 (“In 
some ways, the cooperative form would seem more ideologically amenable to 
cohousing because it combines the common ownership of the land and 
improvements (including the common house and residential units) with a 
shareholder ownership interest and proprietary leases for residents.”). 
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variety of legal structures, these structures are quite hollow. Thus, 
within takings law, these legal structures cannot be relied upon to 
determine when additional remedies that redress loss of 
communality should apply. The following Parts will therefore 
outline a different way of making this assessment. 
 
II. GUIDELINES FOR A REFORM: WHICH COMMUNITIES AND 
INDIVIDUALS SHOULD BE ENTITLED TO ADDITIONAL 
REMEDIES? 
 
In fulfilling its pluralistic obligation, the state should enable its 
citizens to realize their own conceptions of the good by offering 
them a sufficiently wide range of meaningful legal institutions. 
Insofar as we believe that “structuring our geographic localities 
into . . . local communities fulfills an important human need and 
facilitates the pursuit of worthy civic virtues, we need to 
incorporate this vision into our legal rules.”66 The aim of this Part 
is to offer guidelines for implementing a reform in takings law that 
is tied to this vision and recognizes the value of community in 
property. 
The application of a state’s pluralistic obligation to a given 
community should depend on that community’s characteristics. 
This Part therefore argues that the state should take into account 
three factors in determining the treatment of CICs in takings law: 
(1) the nature of community members’ cooperation, i.e., its 
relationship with members’ realization of a shared conception of 
the good; (2) the community’s “social legitimacy”; and (3) the 
community’s need for state support to stay intact. In assessing 
these factors, the state should ensure that the benefits of the reform 
are limited to socially legitimate communities that engage in 
sufficiently meaningful cooperation. 
 
A. The Nature of a Community’s Cooperation 
 
Strictly speaking, community as a property value represents 
cooperation of two or more persons who are jointly involved in an 
asset. However, not all cooperation should be recognized as 
                                                            
66 DAGAN, supra note 8, at 106.  
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expressing the value of community in property. Instead, for a 
community’s cooperation to be sufficiently meaningful, it must be 
founded upon a conception of the good that promotes norms of 
cooperation rather than separation, exclusion, or individualism. 
Property owners interact in different ways and to reach different 
goals. Yet, not all types of cooperation among neighboring 
property owners should be regarded as expressing the value of 
community in property for the purposes of a reformed takings 
regime.  
Recognition of cooperation in property law should not be 
dependent on the cooperators’ motivations, but rather on the role 
such cooperation plays in ensuring pluralism. Gregory Alexander 
argues that a foundational pluralistic conception of property67 
actually entails multiple levels of pluralism in our approach to 
values and goods—a “pluralism of pluralisms.”68 One level entails 
recognition of the legitimacy of a variety of different conceptions 
of the good. The second level refers to the methods by which 
individuals may realize their conceptions of the good. On this 
level, while cooperation may not be an inherent feature of a 
conception of the good, people who adhere to that conception may 
still need to cooperate in order to effectively realize it. For 
example, American Jews often prefer to live in neighborhoods 
where there are at least a few other Jews, since the presence of 
other Jews ensures the existence of common religious 
institutions.69 Although cooperation itself may not be a religious 
commandment, religious people may find that cooperating with 
others of the same faith facilitates their ability to realize their 
conception of the good. Should such cooperation be regarded as 
expressing the value of community in property? If we embrace 
foundational pluralism, the answer is yes. Foundational pluralism 
                                                            
67 ANDERSON, supra note 9, at 14–15. 
68 Alexander, supra note 10, at 1036. 
69 See Amitai Etzioni, The Ghetto—A Re-Evaluation, 37 SOC. FORCES 
255, 259 (1958) (“The reasons for the lower limit [of Jews within an area] may 
be that [Jews] prefer to not live in an area in which there is no synagogue, no 
Jewish Sunday school, no opportunity to have Jewish friends and potential 
Jewish marriage partners for their children.”). 
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posits that pluralism exists all the way down.70 Accordingly, 
property law, and takings law in particular, should accommodate 
the value of community both in cases where cooperation is 
inherent to the cooperators’ shared conception of the good71 and in 
cases where cooperation is extrinsic, that is, only a means for 
realizing a conception of the good.  
However, recognition of even extrinsic cooperation as 
expressing the value of the community in property may lead to the 
conclusion that any loss of cooperation between neighbors should 
be compensable in takings law. Such broad recognition of 
neighborly collaboration leaves us in the current scenario where no 
distinctions exist between communities based on the forms and 
functions of their cooperation. Therefore, this Part offers a two-
stage analysis in order to determine whether a specific form of 
cooperation should be recognized as expressing the value of 
community in property, and to what extent this should affect the 
legal treatment it receives. 
 
1. Stage One: Verifying a Shared Conception of the 
Good 
 
Under the proposed regime, the first step is to decide whether 
cooperation exists, which is very likely the case for any CIC. The 
next step is to determine if that cooperation is meaningful. 
Cooperation is “meaningful” if (1) it is directed toward the 
realization of a shared conception of the good; and (2) it is not 
founded on individualistic and exclusionary norms or values that 
fail to contribute to a sense of community.  
Although there are differing views with respect to the proper 
content of a conception of the good,72 for the purposes of this 
                                                            
70 Alexander, supra note 10, at 1020–21. See also Mason, supra note 9.  
71 Consider, for example, the Israeli kibbutz, in which the shared 
conception of the good calls for ongoing cooperation. 
72 See, e.g., JOHN M. FINNIS, NATURAL LAW AND NATURAL RIGHTS 81–97 
(1982) (presenting a list of the basic aspects of human well-being); MARTHA C. 
NUSSBAUM, WOMEN AND HUMAN DEVELOPMENT: THE CAPABILITIES APPROACH 
4–15, 76–96 (2001) (presenting a list of central human capabilities and their 
relation to humans’ conceptions of the good); ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE 
JURISPRUDENCE: AN INTRODUCTION 31–36 (2011) (reviewing several 
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proposal, there is no need to choose one in particular. John Rawls’s 
definition may be best: a definition of the good should consist “of a 
more or less determined scheme of final ends, that is, ends we want 
to realize for their own sake.”73 Therefore, for the purposes of this 
first-stage examination, a conception of the good need only have 
the ultimate goal of fulfilling the conditions deemed necessary for 
a valuable and worthwhile life.74 Such conceptions are many and 
diverse.75 They may have different characteristics: economic, 
social, cultural, religious, and may also differ in their 
comprehensiveness. While some might infuse every aspect of life, 
others may be less sweeping.76 At this stage, no normative 
judgments regarding conceptions of good are required. 
But if we accept any conception of the good as a legitimate 
end, what cooperation would not be recognized as meaningful? 
The answer is twofold: first, cooperation that does not promote a 
conception of the good, and second, cooperation that promotes a 
conception of the good but does not express or promote the value 
of community. 
To illustrate, consider gated communities. Scott E. 
Nonnemaker conducted thorough research about life in three gated 
communities in New Tampa, Florida.77 Nonnemaker’s findings 
show that the owners in the Arbor Greene, Hunter’s Green, and 
Grand Hampton gated communities were motivated to purchase 
property in these communities not because of their search for 
social interaction with their neighbors, but rather because of their 
                                                            
approaches to the definition of “the good” and concluding that all approaches 
alike rely on a description of human nature, of the human experience and of 
human universality in formulating their respective lists of goods); Joseph Chan, 
Legitimacy, Unanimity, and Perfectionism, 29 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 5, 10–16 
(2000) (arguing that a conception of “the good” may refer to judgments not only 
of a person’s life, but also specific activities, values, experiences and states of 
affairs). 
73 See RAWLS, supra note 11, at 19.  
74 JONATHAN QUONG, LIBERALISM WITHOUT PERFECTION 2 (2011). 
75 RAWLS, supra note 11, at 19–20. 
76 Id. at 13–14, 19–20. See also QUONG, supra note 74, at 13–14. 
77 Scott E. Nonnemaker, Living Behind Bars?: An Investigation of Gated 
Communities in New Tampa, Florida (Apr. 6, 2009) (unpublished M.A. thesis, 
University of South Florida) (on file with University of South Florida).   
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desire for security and high property values.78 Searching for some 
evidence of communality, Nonnemaker asked these gated 
communities’ members whether they perceive their relationship 
with their co-members as cohabitation or as a community.79 An 
owner in Hunter’s Green answered:  
I can’t even tell you what my neighbor look like 
barely [sic]. Talk to one guy across the street once 
in a while . . . we tried the ‘neighbor’ thing in other 
areas, but it wasn’t for us. We prefer our home and 
keeping to ourselves . . . it’s a cohabitation . . . 
simply just an economic arrangement between me 
and them.80   
Arbor Greene, Hunter’s Green, and Grand Hampton are far 
from unique. Empirical studies reveal that the search for 
communality is often a secondary, if not tertiary, consideration for 
owners in gated communities.81 Blakely and Snyder argue that 
gated community owners often seek to cooperate to maintain their 
high home values and to reduce crime in the surrounding area, but 
for little else.82  
                                                            
78 Id. at ix.  
79 Id. at 129. 
80 Id. at 129–30.  
81 See SARAH BLANDY ET AL., GATED COMMUNITIES: A SYSTEMATIC 
REVIEW OF THE RESEARCH EVIDENCE, 24–27 (ESRC Centre for Neighborhood 
Research, U.K. 2003) (summarizing several empirical studies which were 
conducted in gated communities in the United State showing that the community 
life and interaction with neighbors in such communities were low); Edward J. 
Blakely & Mary Gail Snyder, Divided We Fall: Gated and Walled Communities 
in the United States, in ARCHITECTURE OF FEAR 85, 89–90 (Nan Ellin, ed., 
1997) (classifying gated communities into three categories: lifestyle, elite, and 
security zone, and arguing that in all three types the search for communality 
plays only a secondary or tertiary role in owners’ decision of purchase). 
82 See, e.g., EDWARD JAMES BLAKELEY, FORTRESS AMERICA: GATED 
COMMUNITIES IN THE UNITED STATES 15-18 (1999); Blakely & Snyder, supra 
note 81, at 90; BLANDY ET AL., supra note 81, at 2 (“It would appear that gated 
communities are not self-evidently attractive places to live. Existing research 
showed that motivations for living in a gated community are primarily driven by 
the need for security and a more generalized fear of crime.”); Gary T. Marx, The 
Engineering of Social Control: The Search for the Silver Bullet, in CRIME AND 
INEQUALITY 225, 231–39 (John G. Hagan & Ruth D. Peterson eds., 1995). 
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Should such cooperation be entitled to different legal treatment 
than that applied to fee simple ownership? The answer is no, for 
two reasons. First, such gated communities do not promote any 
distinct conception of the good insofar as security and monetary 
property values are commonplace ideals. And second, even if we 
are to assume that such gated communities do cooperate in pursuit 
of a conception of the good, the conception should not be entitled 
to different legal treatment because it fails to express the 
community’s distinct value. 
Gated communities are primarily a locus of seclusion and 
segregation for the wealthy.83 Membership in such communities 
does not depend on a commitment to a shared notion of the good, 
but rather on members’ ability to pay for the services provided to 
them, services that are generally supposed to be of higher quality 
than those local governments provide to the general population.84 It 
should come as no surprise then that “[c]ontrary to popular claims, 
studies show that [gated communities] are associated with low 
community participation and cohesion.”85 The difference, then, 
between life inside the gates of such communities and that of the 
population at large is a difference of degree, not of kind.86 
Cooperation among members is designed to reduce the costs 
                                                            
83 BLAKELEY, supra note 82, at 8. See also Blandy et al, supra note 81, at 
2 (“Importantly there was no apparent desire to come into contact with the 
‘community’ within the gated or walled area.”); Amnon Lehavi, How Property 
Can Create, Maintain, or Destroy Community, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 
43, 58–59 (2009) (questioning the existence of a shared conception of the good 
in such communities); Evan McKenzie, Constructing the Pomerium in Las 
Vegas: A Case Study of Emerging Trends in American Gated Communities, 20 
HOUSING STUD. 187, 187–92 (2005). 
84 See Elena Vesselinov & William Falk, Gated Communities and Spatial 
Inequality, 29 J. URB. AFF. 109, 110–112, 118–19 (2007). 
85 Id. at 119.  
86 The distinction between qualitative and quantitative differences 
suggests that the things valued by gated communities’ members are not unique 
but, instead, are shared by the entire population. People who live outside the 
gates of such communities also regard personal security as an important feature 
of a valued life and, just like gated communities’ members, will also seek to 
maintain their assets’ value. Therefore, personal security or the will to preserve 
an asset’s value should not be considered as part of a conception of the good that 
requires cooperation. 
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associated with obtaining high quality services by pooling 
members’ financial resources together. There is no shared 
conception of the good that is unique to gated community owners.   
But even if we assume that a gated community shares a 
conception of the good, the ultimate outcome of the analysis would 
be no different. Gated communities are generally designed to be a 
“villa in the jungle,” offering their members a peaceful and 
trouble-free life.87 In order to realize this conception of the good, 
members of gated communities cooperate only in order to exclude 
non-members and ensure their own independence, safety, and 
property values. In other words, a gated community’s shared 
conception of the good is centered on isolation and low social 
cohesion. Such a conception of the good—even if it can be 
established as a genuine conception of the good—should not be 
entitled to remedies for communal loss.88  
 
2. Stage Two: Classifying the Role of a Community’s 
Cooperation 
 
Assuming a legitimate conception of the good is identified in 
the first stage of the examination—be it religious, economic, 
cultural or otherwise—the next step is to determine the role of 
cooperation in the community’s ability to realize that good. Simply 
put, the more significant the role cooperation plays in community 
members’ ability to realize their shared conception of the good, the 
greater the justification for deviating from takings law’s existing 
remedy formula. When cooperation plays only a marginal or 
                                                            
87 BLAKELEY, supra note 82, at 15–18. 
88 It is important, however, to emphasize that denying gated communities 
remedies for loss of communality in the law of takings does not deny their right 
to exist; a foundational pluralistic conception of property legitimizes 
individualistic conceptions of the good no less than it legitimizes conceptions 
that are built on cooperation. However, members of the type of gated 
community described above do not see the community as having value in itself, 
but rather seek to ensure that the internal governance of the community causes 
as little harm as possible to their individual property rights, and would likely 
refuse to subject themselves to a demanding set of obligations during their 
membership in the community. They should therefore not be entitled to 
additional compensation if the state expropriates their land. 
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secondary role, the law should only be sensitive to the existence of 
such cooperation or moderately support it. On the other hand, if the 
cooperation is crucial to a community’s realization of its 
conception of the good, remedies should be available that are 
oriented towards its preservation. 
In order to identify the role of cooperation in a community’s 
realization of its conception of the good, this Part proposes three 
distinct categories: (1) constitutive cooperation; (2) value-adding 
cooperation; and (3) facilitative cooperation. Cooperation is 
constitutive if it is an inherent and vital feature of the conception of 
the good—not only an instrument for the realization of the 
conception of the good, but as an end unto itself. An example of 
constitutive cooperation can be found in the historic Israeli 
kibbutz. Within this setting, cooperation serves both as an aspect of 
the desired good and as an instrument for its achievement. Israeli 
law defines a kibbutz as “a free association of people for the 
purposes of settlement, absorption of new immigrants, 
maintenance of a cooperative society based on community 
ownership of property, self-sufficiency in labor, equality and 
cooperation in all areas of production, consumption and 
education.”89 Property scholar Avital Margalit explains that “the 
kibbutz is an exemplary and equitable way of communal living for 
people who believe in the ideals of equality, brotherhood and 
mutual assistance.”90 Cooperation, then, not only enables the 
community to function properly, but is one of the essential 
elements of the good itself.  
Other instances of cooperation may simply facilitate a group’s 
ability to realize its shared conception of the good without being an 
indispensable part of the conception. Consider the House of 
Commons community in Austin, Texas. The House of Commons 
community is a residential cooperative and part of the University 
of Texas Inter-Cooperative Council, a non-profit student housing 
                                                            
89 Cooperative Societies Ordinance (Types of Societies), 5756–1995, 
5722 LSI 244 (1995) (Isr.) (emphasis added). 
90 Avital Margalit, Commons and Legality, in PROPERTY AND 
COMMUNITY 141, 159 (Gregory S. Alexander & Eduardo M. Peñalver eds., 
2010). 
168 JOURNAL OF LAW AND POLICY 
 
organization, which focuses on vegan and vegetarian lifestyles.91 
The community only serves meals that are vegan or vegetarian.92 
The house purchases almost nothing except organic food, and meat 
is not allowed on the property.93 Although veganism has become a 
common way of life for many people who live outside a defined 
geographic communal setting,94 vegans may still encounter 
difficulties as they seek to live according to their beliefs. For 
instance, they may discover that local grocery stores do not sell 
many products they can eat. They may find themselves forced to 
work in businesses that do not respect their way of life, and they 
may have to ask restaurant staff to accommodate their dietary 
restrictions. If a group of vegans unite in order to form a vegan 
community, a significant portion of these difficulties are likely to 
be resolved. It would be easier for vegans to live in a community 
where the shops and businesses cater to their lifestyles, relieving 
them of the burden of finding acceptable foods and of the need to 
ask about the ingredients in the food they consume. Accordingly, 
though it may be possible for the members of the House of 
Commons to live as vegans while living next to non-vegans, the 
supportive surroundings they gain within the community facilitate 
each individual’s ability to practice veganism.  
Finally, cooperation may be neither constitutive nor 
facilitative, but “value-adding.” This type of cooperation, although 
not an essential element of the good itself, is nevertheless much 
more than an instrument to assist in its realization. Such “value-
adding” cooperation may bring about a qualitative change in a 
community’s realization of its shared conception of the good. 
Cooperation should be regarded as value-adding if, considering the 
group’s values, joint activity has more value than individual 
activity. For example, ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities promote 
                                                            
91 House of Commons, HOUS. OF COMMONS STUDENT HOUSING COOP., 
http://www.iccaustin.coop/hoc/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). 
92 Id.  
93 Id.  
94 A 2012 Gallup poll discovered that five percent of American adults 
consider themselves to be vegetarians and two percent consider themselves to be 
vegans. Frank Newport, In U.S., 5% Consider Themselves Vegetarians, GALLUP 
(July 26, 2012), http://www.gallup.com/poll/156215/consider-themselves-
vegetarians.aspx. 
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their vision of the good through observance of Judaism’s 
commandments and laws.95 Members of such communities 
cooperate on different levels, such as ensuring the existence of 
synagogues and establishing educational institutions that promote 
religious studies. While cooperation plays a significant role in the 
functioning of ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities, however, it 
nevertheless cannot be regarded as constitutive. Jews can fulfill 
their religion’s commandments and laws without being a member 
of a geographic religious community. But, as provided by Jewish 
law, cooperation not only makes it easier for individuals to realize 
their conception of the good, but adds significant value and 
meaning to its realization. For example, a Jewish person is 
commanded to pray three times on an average day. A Jewish 
person may fulfill this religious commandment by praying alone, 
but Jewish law urges men to always pray in a quorum of at least 
ten.96 Thus, Orthodox Jewish Communities derive a very tangible 
                                                            
95 Jewish ultra-Orthodox communities are common within the New York 
area. Communities such as Kiryas Joel (a village within the town 
of Monroe in Orange County, New York, where the great majority of residents 
are Hasidic Jews who strictly observe the Torah and its commandments, and 
belong to the worldwide Satmar Hasidic dynasty) and the ultra-Orthodox 
communities of Williamsburg in Brooklyn maintain a lively community life and 
offer their residents a variety of religious institutions, religious services and 
networks of mutual support. For more on the Kiryas Joel community, see Abner 
S. Greene, Kiryas Joel and Two Mistakes About Equality, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 1 
(1996); Ira C. Lupu, Uncovering the Village of Kiryas Joel, 96 COLUM L. REV. 
104 (1996). Also see the Kiryas Joel community’s website, KIRYAS JOEL VOICE, 
http://www.kjvoice.com/default.asp (last visited Sept. 15, 2014). For more on 
the ultra-Orthodox Jewish communities of Williamsburg, generally see GEORGE 
KRANZLER, HASIDIC WILLIAMSBURG: A CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN HASIDIC 
COMMUNITY (1995). 
96 I would like to demonstrate the additional value of joint action 
according to the Jewish religion with two short (and non-exhaustive) examples. 
The first involves the commandment of praying—a Jewish person is 
commanded to pray three times a day (except on the Sabbath and religious 
holidays, when there are additional prayers). A Jewish person may fulfill the 
religious commandment of praying by praying alone (except for specific prayers 
which are subject to a quorum of 10 men). However, the code of Jewish law 
urges people to always pray in a quorum of at least 10 men (Minyan). According 
to the code of Jewish law, by joining nine other Jewish men, the value of the 
prayer increases and it now contains a different, and more valuable, set of 
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benefit in relation to their conception of the good if the community 
is geographically concentrated. 
In light of this classification of the roles that cooperation can 
play in community members’ ability to realize conceptions of the 
good, reconsider the three communities discussed in Part I. 
Cooperation plays a constitutive role in the Bruderhof 
community’s ability to realize its members’ shared conception of 
the good. In order to fulfill the Bruderhof movement’s ideals, a 
member in each of the Bruderhof communities should “take 
lifetime vows of obedience and poverty and [] contribute his or her 
talents to stand on an equal footing with all brothers and sisters.”97 
The same is true for the Acorn community. While the Acorn 
members do not share a religious conception of the good, they 
nevertheless share an economic one. Quite similar to the Israeli 
historic kibbutz, the Acorn community members believe in 
income-sharing, where their members are expected to share their 
land, labor, income and other resources equally or according to 
need.98 As in the case of the historic Israeli Kibbutz, an individual 
cannot fulfill such an economic conception of the good alone.  
                                                            
features and virtues. See SHULCHAN ARUCH 90:9 (“One should attempt to pray 
at a synagogue with the public. And if he cannot, he should pray at the time that 
the public prays.”). Rabbi Moses of Coucy (one of the Shulchan Aruch’s 
interpreters) argues that this also applies to communities in which there is no 
Minyan. The second example involves the commandment of reading the book of 
Esther (Megillah) on the Jewish holiday of Purim. The code of Jewish law states 
that a Jewish person is obligated to read the book of Esther on the eve of the 
Purim holiday and to reread it the next day. However, the code also states that 
“[t]he most desirable way to fulfill the commandment” is to perform the reading 
in public. Therefore, while a Jewish person can fulfill their religious 
commandments privately, such fulfillment has a different, elevated value when 
they cooperate with others. For a summary of the code of Jewish law on this 
matter, see KITZUR SHULCHAN ARUCH 141:9 (“The most desirable way to 
fulfill the commandment is to hear the reading of the Megillah in a 
synagogue, where there are many people, because ’within the multitude of the 
people is the glory of the King.’ At the very least, one should take care to hear it 
in a ‘Minyan’ of ten.  If it is impossible to read it with a ‘Minyan,’ each 
individual should read it from a kosher scroll, with the saying of the blessings 
beforehand.”).  
97 BRUDERHOF, supra note 53.  
98 See About Us, supra note 47.  
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But what about the Ritz? Does the cooperation between 
members of this housing cooperative fit within any one of the 
above-mentioned roles of cooperation? The answer, 
unsurprisingly, is no. As mentioned earlier, the Ritz residents, 
similar to the Hunter’s Green gated community members, seek 
only the least amount of cooperation necessary with their co-
members.99 Therefore, the Ritz fails the first stage examination. 
Yet, even if we were to acknowledge that the Ritz community’s 
search for a luxurious and private lifestyle embodies a conception 
of the good, we might still question whether realization of this 
lifestyle requires cooperation. As in Tampa’s gated 
communities,100 members themselves would probably answer in 
the negative.  
This classification of the potential roles of cooperation in a 
community’s members’ realization of their shared conception of 
the good provides us with an instrument for distinguishing among 
CICs based upon their actual characteristics. Therefore, it can be 
used as a basis for determining the type of legal remedies a 
community should receive when the government takes its property 
through eminent domain.  
 
B. Social Legitimacy 
 
Embracing a foundational pluralistic conception of property 
runs the risk of enabling—or signaling state endorsement of—
communities that abide by norms that explicitly or implicitly 
enforce racial, socio-economic or religious discrimination, or other 
illiberal norms.101 Because a foundational pluralistic conception of 
property regards property as a social instrument that should enable 
people to fulfill diverse views of what constitutes a valuable and 
meaningful life, an assessment of any property arrangement cannot 
                                                            
99 See supra notes 72–76 and accompanying text.  
100 See supra notes 77–82 and accompanying text.  
101 See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 10, at 1126; Hanoch Dagan, Pluralism 
and Perfectionism in Private Law, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 1409, 1431–33 (2012); 
Nomi Maya Stolzenberg, Return of the Repressed: Illiberal Groups in a Liberal 
State,12  J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 897 (2001-2002).  
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be detached from prevailing social norms that promote diversity.102 
After all, the core assertion of foundational pluralism is that 
diversity generally promotes human flourishing.103 
The previous section discussed general categories of 
cooperation that may entitle members of a community to additional 
legal remedies when the government takes their property, 
consistent with the state’s pluralistic obligation to allow diverse 
communities (and not only individualistic communities) to survive 
and flourish. This first stage looks only at whether a community’s 
members share a conception of the good and, if so, how they 
cooperate to achieve that good. The inquiry, however, does not end 
there. The next stage—an assessment of a community’s social 
legitimacy—entails a normative evaluation of the community. 
Foundational pluralism imposes on the state an obligation to 
embrace diversity with the goal of promoting human flourishing. 
Thus, the social legitimacy test operates as a check on the 
unintended harmful effects that may result from compensating a 
loss of communality in communities whose existence is antithetical 
to this goal. As demonstrated below, however, this normative 
evaluation is limited—it is designed to avoid judgment of a 
community’s internal practices and to instead focus on a 
community’s structural openness.  
Consider the Woodcrest community for example. As part of the 
international Bruderhof movement, the Woodcrest community is a 
Christian community that strictly regulates all forms of conduct, 
belief, appearance, dress and demeanor, with particular emphasis 
upon the repression of premarital or extramarital sexual 
expression.104 Some might consider these regulations to be 
violations of conventional liberal norms.105 Julius H. Rubin, for 
                                                            
102 See Gregory S. Alexander, The Social-Obligation Norm in American 
Property Law, 94 CORNELL L. REV . 745, 757 (2009).  
103 See Martha C. Nussbaum, Human Functioning and Social Justice: In 
Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism, 20 POL. THEORY 202 (1992).  
104 Julius H. Rubin, Contested Narratives: A Case Study of the Conflict 
between a New Religious Movement and its Critics, in MISUNDERSTANDING 
CULTS: SEARCHING FOR OBJECTIVITY IN A CONTROVERSIAL FIELD 452, 454 
(Benjamin Zablocki & Thomas Robbins eds., 2001). 
105 See, e.g., Gerald Renner, Bruderhof Leader Defends Close-knit 
Community Against Outside Critics, THE HARTFORD COURANT, Nov. 12, 1995, 
 TAKINGS, COMMUNITY, AND VALUE 173 
 
example, points to the community’s gender inequality practices, 
arguing that “[y]oung women confront the issues of powerlessness 
and gender inequality in spiritual and temporal roles, and severe 
limits are placed upon their aspirations and participation in the 
community.”106 Yet, should a liberal state deny such a community 
the right to exist or provide it less support? Or should such a 
community—which fosters and even enforces illiberal norms 
within its boundaries—be entitled to additional remedies in takings 
law for the loss of communality?  
A liberal state may respond in three ways. First, it may deny 
illiberal communities any state support. Second, it may condition 
its support on the community’s compliance with a state’s defined 
liberal minimum requirements (LMRs).107 Finally, the state, if it 
takes its pluralistic obligation seriously, may seek to use another, 
less normatively charged method of inquiry to determine a 
community’s social legitimacy.  
This third approach is available—and even superior to—the 
two alternate options.  Instead of determining compliance with 
LMRs or cutting off all support, the state should inquire into how 
open a community is to allowing its members to join other 
communities simultaneously, referred to here as multiple 
community belonging (MCB), and should inquire into LMRs only 
as a last resort if the MCB inquiry is inconclusive. This solution is 
based on a sociological redefinition of community that occurred in 
the last century, which highlighted most communities’ loss of 
exclusive dominion over all aspects of members’ lives.108 A 
                                                            
available at http://articles.courant.com/1995-11-12/news/9511120143_1_ 
bruderhof-communes-mennonites (“The movement has also been garnering a 
growing chorus of critics in recent years, including academics who say the 
leaders shut them out, and former members who complain they are not allowed 
to visit their relatives”). 
106 Rubin, supra note 104, at 457. 
107 See STEPHEN MACEDO, DIVERSITY AND DISTRUST: CIVIC EDUCATION 
IN A MULTICULTURAL DEMOCRACY 188–211 (2000). 
108 See, e.g., BARRY WELLMAN, NETWORKS IN THE GLOBAL VILLAGE: 
LIFE IN CONTEMPORARY COMMUNITIES 2–3 (1999); Barry Wellman, The 
Community Question, 84 AM. J. SOC.  1201 (1979); Barry Wellman et al., 
Networks as Personal Communities, in, SOCIAL STRUCTURES: A NETWORK 
APPROACH 130, 133–35 (Barry Wellman & Stephen D. Berkowitz eds., 1988). 
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sociological inquiry into community and its role in the last century 
is the subject of an enormous amount of sociological literature and 
is beyond the scope of this Article.109 It is sufficient, however, to 
recognize German sociologist Georg Simmel’s observation that 
modern society functions as a web of group affiliations, in which 
every person becomes a member of several social groups 
simultaneously.110 This multiple belonging ensures a space of 
freedom for the individual, since one is no longer restricted to one 
all-encompassing community.111 Instead, the individual is allowed 
to maintain her participation in multiple groups, to preserve her 
connections with other individuals, and to participate in different 
modes of cooperation.112  
                                                            
109 See, e.g., ANTHONY PAUL COHEN, BELONGING: IDENTITY AND SOCIAL 
ORGANIZATION IN BRITISH RURAL CULTURES 1–4 (1982); COLIN BELL & 
HOWARD NEWBY, COMMUNITY STUDIES: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE SOCIOLOGY 
OF THE LOCAL COMMUNITY 252 (1971); ROBERT NISBET, THE QUEST FOR 
COMMUNITY: A STUDY IN THE ETHICS OF ORDER AND FREEDOM 47 (2010); 
George A. Hillery, Definitions of Community: Areas of Agreement, 20 RURAL 
SOC’Y 111 (1955). 
110 GEORGE SIMMEL, CONFLICT AND THE WEB OF GROUP AFFILIATIONS 
150 (1955) (“The modern pattern differs sharply from the concentric pattern of 
group affiliation as far as a person’s achievements are concerned. Today 
someone may belong, aside from his occupational position, to a scientific 
association, he may sit on a board of directors of a corporation and occupy an 
honorific position in the city government.”). 
111 Id. at 130 (“In general, this type of development tends to enlarge the 
sphere of freedom: not because the affiliation with, and the dependence on 
groups, has been abandoned, but because it has become a matter of choice with 
whom one affiliates and upon whom one is dependent.”). 
112 Id. Morris Janowitz followed Simmel’s notion of multiple community 
belonging. In what he termed “communities of limited liability,” Janowitz 
argues that the communities of the modern age are characterized by their partial 
role in their members’ lives and by the relatively low commitment of their 
members. Therefore, Janowitz argues that “in a highly mobile society[,] people 
may participate extensively in local institutions and develop community 
attachments”; yet, due to its modern conception, the individual’s search for the 
support of others is constrained by his resistance to being controlled by others. 
These conflicting tendencies are the basis of contemporary communities, which 
are, according to Janowitz, of “limited liability.” See John D. Kasarda and 
Morris Janowitz, Community Attachment in Mass Society, 39 AM. SOC. REV. 
328, 329 (1974). 
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The ability of community members to engage with people from 
outside their home community exposes them to different values 
and norms. These unmediated encounters help facilitate 
individuals’ abilities to reflect on their communities’ prevailing 
norms. This situation leaves individuals with three possible 
responses. Those who have been exposed to different sets of norms 
than those prevailing in their community may decide to leave their 
community since they no longer share its values; they may decide 
to stay within the community and try to change it from the inside; 
or, they may decide to stay and conform to community norms.  
Since, in each case, an informed individual has made a choice, a 
liberal state should respect the decision. The current social reality, 
in which a person may belong simultaneously to more than one 
community, thus significantly reduces the risk that an individual 
will be oppressed by any particular community of which she is a 
member.113 Furthermore, by engaging simultaneously in several 
communities, individuals are no longer confined to a single, all-
encompassing community and enjoy a greater degree of 
freedom.114 In the context of the modern diverse state, this 
condition is normal and should be encouraged.  
By focusing on communities’ structural openness, which 
allows members to simultaneously belong to other communities, 
the state may establish a policy for addressing illiberal 
communities that is both liberal and pluralistic. An MCB test 
simply asks whether an individual is allowed to occupy different 
positions in different communities at the same time. If the answer 
is yes, the community may be entitled to enhanced takings 
remedies despite being superficially illiberal. While not entirely 
eliminating questions concerning norms and values, the MCB test 
sidesteps them to focus attention instead on community structure 
and boundaries.  
The MCB test is superior to the two alternatives presented 
above for several reasons. First, in comparison with denying 
illiberal communities additional takings remedies, the MCB test 
commits the state to its pluralistic obligation to ensure a diverse 
society in which different—sometimes radically different—
                                                            
113 See SIMMEL, supra note 110, at 130. 
114 Id.  
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conceptions of the good may co-exist. Second, the MCB test will 
reduce clashes between the liberal state and illiberal communities. 
Such clashes are often a result of communities’ resistance to state 
intervention into internal ethical conduct,115 and the MCB test 
sidesteps any such direct intervention. The MCB’s structural 
demand does not impinge on the community’s internal conduct, 
and instead only requires it to give up the use of seclusion and 
isolation as instruments for ensuring the preservation of its 
conception of the good. Furthermore, protecting a community’s 
internal conduct from state intervention may temper an illiberal 
community’s tendency to block members from engaging with 
outsiders.  
Finally, the MCB test avoids the ambiguity inherent in LMR-
based determinations. LMRs are determined by the government, 
may be vague, and do not necessarily have identical content and 
scope from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. For example, while most 
liberal governments use LMRs in setting children’s education 
policy (usually by establishing an official core curriculum), the 
scope of these requirements varies greatly across jurisdictions, as 
do the implications of a community’s rejection of the state’s 
requirements.116 This ambiguity leads to a lack of uniformity and 
                                                            
115 A recent legal clash involving the legitimacy of educational LMRs 
occurred in Canada, where the Quebec education authorities ordered the transfer 
of thirteen children from the Lev Tahor Jewish Ultra-Orthodox community to 
foster care. See Lev Tahor Child Removal Order Upheld by Ontario Judge, CBC 
NEWS, (Feb. 3, 2014, 3:05 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/ 
news/canada/montreal/lev-tahor-child-removal-order-upheld-by-ontario-judge-
1.2521639. The government alleged that the children—who are 
homeschooled—did not know basic math, and some could not speak either 
English or French. Id. In November 2014, approximately 250 Lev Tahor 
adherents fled to Ontario from Quebec just ahead of the order to seize the 
children. Id. The community’s move to Ontario was the result of the Quebec 
government’s continuous intervention in the community’s internal conduct, 
especially the educational authorities’ efforts to force the community to use a 
secular curriculum for teaching its home-schooled children. Id. By moving to 
Ontario, a province which is more tolerant of faith-based schooling and has been 
a lure for other religious communities, the Lev Tahor community attempted to 
regain control of its inner space. Id. 
116 As the Lev Tahor case demonstrates, different jurisdictions may 
embrace entirely different intervention policies, which affect the incentives of 
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makes it difficult for states to monitor communities and enforce 
their requirements.117 The MCB test overcomes these obstacles by 
creating a simple and uniform test. In most situations, the 
characteristics of the community in question will provide answers. 
This is because all-encompassing communities rarely hide their 
characteristics; on the contrary, they highlight their distinctiveness. 
In more ambiguous cases, when the community may not hold itself 
out as all-encompassing (perhaps out of a desire to avoid state 
interference), the state may require the community to prove its 
compliance with the MCB model by requiring presentation of 
evidence and data as to its members’ participation in other 
communities.  
In the context of takings law reform, a conclusion about a 
community’s social legitimacy should affect the community’s 
entitlement to additional remedies for communal loss. As long as a 
community allows MCB, it remains entitled to whatever benefits it 
would receive otherwise. When a community does not allow MCB, 
however, the state should investigate the reasons for the absence of 
MCB. The state should determine whether the absence of 
community members’ participation in other communities is the 
result of (1) a decision by community authorities (or significantly 
encouraged by those authorities); (2) community members’ free 
choice; (3) geographic distance or other physical factors;118 or (4) 
other lack of opportunity.119 
                                                            
communities to reside within a specific jurisdiction. See id. This is not the first 
time that a religious minority has fled Quebec because of the provincial 
government’s enforcement of it secular curriculum. In 2007, members of 
Quebec’s only Mennonite community would not send their children to 
government-approved schools, balking at the teaching of evolution, the 
acceptance of gays and lesbians and low “morality standards.” Even if parents in 
the community home-schooled their children, they would have had to follow the 
official Quebec curriculum and make arrangements with the local school board, 
whereas in Ontario and New Brunswick, parents who home-school their 
children are not required to abide by an official government curriculum. Thus, 
the Mennonite group fled to New Brunswick and Ontario. See Townsfolk Sad to 
see Mennonites Move Away, Montreal Gazette (Aug.16, 2007), 
http://www.canada.com/montrealgazette/news/story.html?id=8aa6f3f4-45fd-
42d3-ad45-38b1106bddfc. 
117 See id.  
118 Allowing state intervention in geographically remote communities, 
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Then, if a community disallows MCB, the state should 
determine if the community complies with the state’s LMRs. 
While communities that comply with LMRs (and do not comply 
with MCB) should not be entirely denied alternative takings 
remedies, their refusal to comply with MCB should affect the 
scope and scale of their entitlement to these remedies. Finally, 
communities that reject both social legitimization tests—MCB and 
LMRs—should be denied additional remedies when their property 
is expropriated by the state. This assertion implies nothing about 
these communities’ conceptions of the good or the role cooperation 
plays in their realization. It is simply that these communities’ 
refusal to comply with either one of the social legitimacy standards 
exempts the state from its pluralistic obligation to compensate such 
communities for their loss of communality.  
Based upon this two-part social legitimacy test, reconsider the 
Woodcrest community’s entitlement to additional remedies for loss 
of communality.120 As demonstrated in the previous Parts, 
Woodcrest clearly has a defined, shared conception of the good, 
and cooperation clearly plays a constitutive role in realizing that 
good. At first glance, then, the Woodcrest community should 
receive additional remedies for communal loss if expropriation 
occurs. Nevertheless, some may question the social legitimacy of 
the Woodcrest community, arguing that by realizing its shared 
conception of the good, the community over-regulates its members 
                                                            
based solely on their remoteness, would unreasonably discriminate against such 
communities without properly taking into account whether the community’s 
norms are contrary to MCB. In cases where external reasons prevent the 
community’s members from simultaneously belonging to several communities, 
the community should be able to choose from two alternative paths. The first 
alternative is for the community to prove that it allows its members to belong to 
other communities. An example of this would be to demonstrate that the 
community’s norms encourage such multiple belonging among its members. 
The second (and more practical) alternative requires the community to subject 
itself to an examination of whether it complies with liberal minimum 
requirements. 
119 See, e.g., Chandran Kukathas, Are There Any Cultural Rights?, 20 
POL. THEORY 105, 134 (1992) (“The most important condition which makes 
possible a substantive freedom to exit from a community is the existence of a 
wider society that is open to individuals wishing to leave their local groups.”). 
120 See supra notes 53–57 and accompanying text.  
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and violates conventional liberal norms, in particular by relegating 
women to subsidiary roles. Therefore, should the Woodcrest 
community lose its entitlement to additional remedies for the loss 
of communality?  
In order to answer this question the state should start by 
determining whether the Woodcrest community passes the MCB 
test. If asked, members of the Woodcrest community would 
probably answer in the affirmative. The Bruderhof movement does 
not prohibit its members from becoming involved with their local 
neighborhoods and allows young community members to attend 
colleges and universities.121 Some (though not most) of the 
community members work outside the community and join other 
leisure time interest communities, such as book clubs.122  In short, 
Woodcrest members are exposed to outside groups and may freely 
choose to exit the community or remain within it. Therefore, 
though the Woodcrest community might not fit everyone’s 
definition of liberalism, it should still trigger the state’s pluralistic 
obligation, entitling the community to additional remedies for the 
loss of communality. In concluding that the community meets the 
MCB requirement, the state obviates any need for further 
investigation into the community’s compliance with LMRs. On the 
other hand, if the state concludes that a community’s members do 
not belong to multiple communities, it should further investigate 
the reasons for this isolation, as well as the community’s 
                                                            
121 FAQ: Do Bruderhof Young People Go to College or University?, 
BRUDERHOF, http://www.bruderhof.com/en/about/faq (last visited Sept. 15, 
2014). When asked whether college-age members of the Bruderhof community 
attend college or University, Tim, a teacher in the community responded:  
Yes. Many of the Bruderhof’s young people go to college. We 
don’t want young people who grew up in the community to 
stay in the community because they think this is the only place 
where they can make it. We want them to feel that if they 
wanted to, they can go out to the world and earn money and be 
a success but to choose life in community because of a calling 
from God. 
Id.  
122 FAQ: Do You Get Involved In Your Local Neighborhood?, 
BRUDERHOF, http://www.bruderhof.com/en/about/faq (last visited Sept. 15, 
2014). 
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compliance with state-determined LMRs. Fortunately, as the 
Woodcrest example proves, many of these investigations should be 
unnecessary.  
 
C.  Community Strength 
 
This Article has thus far discussed how, in the context of the 
law’s treatment of CICs, the contours of the state’s pluralistic 
obligation should depend on two factors: (1) whether the 
community cooperates toward realizing a shared conception of the 
good; and (2) whether the community complies with MCB and 
LMRs. This section further limits the scope of the state’s 
pluralistic obligation by arguing that it should also be contingent 
on a community’s political or economic strength. I argue that 
stronger communities generally should be treated differently than 
weaker, but similarly situated, communities. In the takings law 
context, tailoring the remedy in this way best tracks the state’s 
pluralistic obligation because it recognizes that some communities 
are better situated to continue to flourish post-taking than others. 
All kinds of people live in CICs and socioeconomic diversity 
can be found in all forms of cooperative ownership. The question 
then arises: should takings law distinguish among CICs based on 
their economic or political strength? On paper, takings law is blind 
to economic or political differences among individuals and 
communities. It is generally acknowledged, however, that such 
considerations often affect eminent domain decisions. Blight 
condemnations, urban renewal programs, and redevelopment 
projects—which often serve as the “public use” justification for 
eminent domain—all affect, not coincidentally, assets belonging to 
poor property owners.123 The current takings law compensation 
                                                            
123 See, e.g., Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky, Takings Reassessed, 
87 VA. L. REV. 277, 300 (2001) (“A concern for the distribution of societal 
burdens may trump administrative efficiency considerations, and as we showed, 
the problem of derivative takings disproportionately harms the poor.”); David A. 
Dana, The Law and Expressive Meaning of Condemning the Poor after Kelo, 
101 NW. U. L. REV. 365, 375–76 (2007) (“As a practical matter, however, I 
suspect this change means that authorities can continue to use blight 
condemnations in poor areas and will face a real challenge only if they attempt 
to stretch the blight category to include solidly working-class or (even more so) 
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formula, which requires compensating the owner with the fair 
market value of the condemned property, incentivizes government 
authorities to target the property of poor and politically 
marginalized owners rather than property belonging to the rich and 
influential.124 As Justice Thomas wrote in his dissent in Kelo v. 
City of New London, it is always the economically and politically 
weak communities that are expected to bear disproportionately the 
burden of realizing public projects.125 Nevertheless, takings law, 
given its uniform remedy scheme, fails to take into account the 
political or economic wealth of parties subject to takings. 
Nevertheless, the contention that takings law should recognize 
community strength is based on properly limiting the scope of the 
state’s pluralistic obligation. As discussed, foundational pluralism 
does not require the state to actively support or promote any 
conception of the good. The state’s obligation is limited to 
                                                            
middle-class areas”); Ilya Somin, Is Post-Kelo Eminent Domain Reform Bad for 
the Poor?, 101 NW. U. L. REV. 1931 (2007). 
124 See, e.g., Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 123, at 283 (“Roads and 
undesirable public facilities are usually built in poor areas because the value of 
property in such areas is lower.”); William A. Fischel & Perry Shapiro, A 
Constitutional Choice Model of Compensation for Takings, 9 Int’l Rev. L. & 
Econ. 115, 122 (1989) (“A common historical account of the rationale for 
including the just compensation requirement in the U.S. Constitution is that it 
was designed to curb the inclinations of political majorities to impose excessive 
burdens on politically isolated minorities.”); Konstantin Sonin, Why the Rich 
May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights, 31 J. COMP. ECON. 715 (2003); 
Derek Werner, The Public Use Clause, Common Sense and Takings, 10 B.U. 
PUB. INT. L.J. 335, 346–47 n.81 (2000) (“While the human nature of 
government officials is a potential source of abuse in any legislative decision, 
the condemnation decision is particularly susceptible to abuse. First, there is a 
strong incentive for interest groups to attempt to influence government officials 
and a correspondingly strong incentive for government officials to comply with 
their demands. Second, taking property provides an effective means of 
subjugating a disfavored group.”). 
125 Kelo v. City of New London, 545 U.S. 469, 521 (2005) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting) (“Allowing the government to take property solely for public 
purposes is bad enough, but extending the concept of public purpose to 
encompass any economically beneficial goal guarantees that these losses will 
fall disproportionately on poor communities. Those communities are not only 
systematically less likely to put their lands to the highest and best social use, but 
are also the least politically powerful.”). 
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establishing conditions that allow the existence of diverse 
conceptions of the good that comply with the LMR and MCB 
model requirements. Such an obligation may require distinguishing 
among communities based on certain characteristics for the 
purpose of allocating takings remedies, but the state should only 
seek to ensure pluralism by rectifying inadequacies in the law that 
make it extremely difficult or impossible for certain communities 
to continue flourishing post-taking. 
Ensuring that takings law fulfills the state’s pluralistic 
obligation justifies taking into account communities’ political or 
economic strength and compensating strong communities less than 
similarly situated, but weaker, communities. Stronger communities 
are more likely to have the resources and influence to avoid the 
damaging effects of eminent domain without government 
assistance.126 Politically strong communities may use their political 
ties and influence to fend off expropriation, and economically 
strong communities may be safe because of the high costs that the 
state would incur by taking their land.127 Moreover, members of 
these communities are less likely to lose their ability to realize 
their shared notion of the good—whether jointly or separately—if 
their land is in fact condemned. Members of politically strong 
communities usually share the same sense of the good as the 
majority of the public. Therefore, even if expropriation affects 
such a community’s functioning, community members are 
expected to be able to continue realizing their shared conception of 
good by joining other similar communities. In addition, even if a 
politically strong community does not share the majority’s 
conception of the good, it may still use its political influence to 
bypass bureaucratic barriers in reestablishing itself. Members of 
                                                            
126 Naturally, communities that enjoy political or economic strength are 
less likely to be subject to eminent domain in the first place. See, e.g., Daniel A. 
Farber, Economic Analysis and Just Compensation, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 
125, 130 (1992) (“[I]f public choice theory has any one key finding, it is that 
small groups with high stakes have a disproportionately great influence on the 
political process. Thus, landowners have some political advantages in seeking 
compensation.”); William Michael Treanor, The Original Understanding of the 
Takings Clause and the Political Process, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 782, 863–65 
(1995). 
127 See Bell & Parchomovsky, supra note 123, at 283. 
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economically strong communities also are more likely to preserve 
their conception of the good than those in weaker communities 
since they are more likely to have the resources to independently 
reestablish the community. 
Therefore, belonging to a politically or economically strong 
community reduces the concern that community members will lose 
their ability to realize their conception of the good, even when the 
community’s ability to function is affected by the government’s 
exercise of eminent domain. Accordingly, the need for the state to 
actively intervene to help these communities is reduced, and may 
in fact be a waste of government resources. At the same time, it is 
entirely possible that members of these communities will 
sometimes encounter difficulties in the face of expropriation. 
Therefore, politically or economically strong communities should 
not be completely excluded from an alternative remedy scheme. 
However, keeping in mind the purpose of the reform and the 
state’s pluralistic obligation, these communities should receive 
reduced benefits. 
 
III.  WHO GETS WHAT? DETERMINING THE PROPER ALLOCATION 
OF REMEDIES 
 
In practice, how should the principles and guidelines discussed 
above shape a reform of takings law? How should the government 
actually allocate alternative takings remedies and what form should 
these remedies take? This Article proposes reforming takings law 
not only through the explicit recognition of various conceptions of 
the good, but also by recognizing that the state may use diverse 
mechanisms to fulfill its pluralistic obligations. Any reform should 
enhance the ability of people to live in accordance with their 
values and beliefs, while at the same time acknowledging other 
social values (such as autonomy, efficiency, and distributive 
justice). Expanding the range of potential takings remedies gives 
meaning to an individual’s choice of residential configuration. 
Alternative takings remedies should include non-monetary or in-
kind benefits, and should be allocated based upon the needs of the 
affected community in relation to the three considerations outlined 
previously: the community’s conception of the good, social 
legitimacy, and political and economic strength. This approach 
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strikes the right balance between the pluralistic principle that 
supports various communities’ continued functioning and other 
competing considerations, such as efficiency and liberty.  
 
A. New Remedies Tailored to Community Needs 
 
For the state to fulfill its pluralistic obligation, the selection of 
remedies should begin by determining the nature of the taking and 
its influence on the community members’ ability to continue 
realizing a shared conception of the good. Parchomovsky and 
Siegelman split expropriations into three categories.128 First, 
“Isolated” expropriations are those that affect only one or a few 
community members.129 Second, “Tipping” expropriations are 
those where the government condemns multiple properties in a 
given residential community, and in doing so, potentially threatens 
the community’s ability to continue functioning.130 Third, 
“Clearing” expropriations are those that uproot the entire 
community.131 
For certain small-scale takings, a market-value mechanism may 
still be appropriate. However, it is likely only to fulfill the 
individualistic dimension of the state’s pluralistic obligation.132 
Therefore, for Isolated and small-scale Tipping condemnations that 
do not threaten a community’s shared conception of the good, but 
only result in the private loss of one or a few individuals, simple 
fair-market value compensation may remain preferable. In large-
scale expropriations, however, particularly where the community 
engages in constitutive cooperation, the market value mechanism 
may not protect the community’s future cooperation toward the 
realization of a shared conception of the good. Providing fair 
market value compensation to individual owners in these cases 
does not account for this loss of communality, and therefore is by 
itself an inadequate means for the state to fulfill its pluralistic 
obligation. 
                                                            
128 Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 84. 
129 Id. at 137. 
130 Id.  
131 Id. at 138.  
132 See supra note 40. 
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Legal scholars have proposed other takings remedies that 
compensate individuals for losses that go beyond the property’s 
market value. Property scholar Robert Ellickson, has argued for a 
fixed premium in cases where a property’s fair market value fails 
to cover the owner’s subjective losses, by “award[ing] damages for 
the drop in market value plus a bonus award to compensate for loss 
of the commonly held irreplaceable consumer surplus.”133 For 
efficiency reasons, commentators generally seek to establish this 
additional compensation at a fixed rate, without any distinction 
made between different community members.134 However, a fixed 
premium that uniformly indemnifies owners for personal losses 
may have little advantage over market value compensation in 
terms of redressing loss of communality. This is because a fixed 
premium does not distinguish among community members 
according to their involvement in the community, their 
contribution to maintaining cooperation, or their commitment to a 
shared conception of the good.  
When a substantial number of community members are 
affected, as in Tipping expropriations, a variable premium could 
overcome the difficulties facing the fixed premium mechanism. A 
variable premium is more capable of recognizing the salient 
differences among members’ contributions to cooperation and 
commitment to the community.135 While it does not have the 
advantage of cost certainty attendant to market value or fixed 
premium compensation, this concern can be somewhat mitigated 
through the adoption of rules of thumb in lieu of calculating the 
actual loss suffered by each community member. For example, one 
such rule of thumb might concern the nature of the community 
member’s property rights (owning versus renting) or provide 
proportionate increases in compensation to individuals based on 
the length of time they have lived in the community.136 
                                                            
133 Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance 
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 736 (1973). 
134 Id.; Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 32, at 139. 
135 See Ellickson, supra note 133, at 737. 
136 Another assumption is that the longer one lives in a community, the 
more significant the role she plays in the community’s continuation of 
cooperation, and the more she is affected by the loss of that cooperation. 
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Direct community resettlement is another potential remedy.137 
Application of a direct resettlement remedy requires the state to 
reestablish the community in a new location. Such application may 
range from complete resettlement, in which the state builds new 
homes for the expropriated property owners, to cases in which the 
government funds the building of the owners’ new homes. Direct 
resettlement of a community may additionally require the state to 
fund (or to establish) common property (such as roads, 
playgrounds and social institutions). Like other takings remedies, 
resettlement seeks to put the owner in the same position she was in 
before her property was condemned, but shifts most of the burden 
from the owner to the state and challenges the implicit assumption 
of takings law that all property is fungible. The resettlement 
mechanism is also unique in that it creates an ongoing relationship 
between the government and property owner, rather than a one-
time exchange of money and property. Breaking the link between 
money and property might placate critics concerned with 
commodification of property and community,138 increase 
efficiency (especially because it saves the costs of evaluating 
subjective losses), and more importantly, fulfill the collective 
dimension of the state’s pluralistic obligation.139 On the other 
hand, the establishment of an ongoing relationship between the 
state and individuals who have been subject to expropriation 
creates financial uncertainty and entails significant negotiation and 
monitoring costs that exceed those associated with one-shot 
compensation. Therefore, the use of a direct resettlement remedy 
should be limited only to instances where the collective dimension 
of the state’s pluralistic obligation arises. This would usually only 
be the case in Clearing and large-scale Tipping expropriations. 
Finally, the government may provide indirect resettlement 
remedies that foster community rehabilitation. These indirect 
remedies are most likely to take the form of financial assistance or 
removal of bureaucratic barriers. For example, the government 
may provide tax benefits, exemptions from zoning regulations, 
special condition loans, or financial grants. Like direct 
                                                            
137 See Parchomovsky & Siegelman, supra note 31, at 138. 
138 See discussion on anti-commodification in Part IV.B.    
139 See supra note 39.  
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resettlement, these remedies do not explicitly equate property with 
money and may reduce commodifying effects and evaluation costs 
for subjective losses. They also offer the community customized 
solutions without overstretching the state’s resources. Moreover, 
indirect resettlement remedies may fulfill both the individualistic 
and collective dimension of the state’s pluralistic obligation.140  
Indirect remedies, however, provide only limited and partial 
assistance—they do not offer a comprehensive solution for loss of 
communality. They do not guarantee any particular result. Along 
with uncertainty regarding property owners’ abilities to use these 
forms of assistance, the state cannot easily monitor how a 
community uses these tools, leaving them prone to improper 
use.141 Moreover, the broadly applicable nature of indirect 
resettlement remedies raises concerns that the state may abuse 
these remedies by granting them in an unequal manner. 
Nevertheless, such remedies may provide a balanced solution for 
Tipping expropriations, which impair but do not completely 
prevent community members from realizing their shared 
conception of the good.  
The allocation of these additional remedies should depend on 
the scope and scale of the government’s exercise of eminent 
domain within the community as well as the three factors discussed 
in Part II. The overarching goal is to restrict the availability of 
additional compensation or in-kind remedies to communities 
whose members engage in cooperation that expresses the value of 
community in property and who stand to lose their ability to 
cooperate after their land is taken. 
 
                                                            
140 Id.  
141 One example of such an improper use may be trading in such benefits. 
For example, an owner who is entitled to a loan under special conditions 
(substantially better than those prevailing in the market) might trade the loan to 
profit from the interest rate differentials. Owners may also misuse planning 
easements, which allow them to deviate from certain construction restrictions. 
They may trade these benefits (for example, by selling their houses) for 
economic gain. While the state may restrict the trade in such benefits, such 
restrictions may hold only for a short period of time, before turning into a too 
heavy burden on individuals’ autonomy to use their property rights.  
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B. Tying Remedies to a Community’s Conception of the 
Good, Social Legitimacy, and Community Strength 
 
The remedies outlined above should be applied in direct 
relation to the community’s characteristics as outlined in Part II.  
With respect to the first factor—the role of cooperation in the 
community’s ability to realize its members’ shared conception of 
the good—the more significant the role of cooperation in the 
community’s ability to realize its conception of the good, the 
greater the need for remedies that would allow the continuation of 
that cooperation. Thus, for example, communities that engage in 
constitutive cooperation are most likely to require remedies that 
facilitate the community’s continued existence such as direct 
resettlement assistance. When, on the other hand, cooperation 
plays a relatively marginal role, monetary compensation is likely to 
be a satisfactory remedy, with the size of the premium contingent 
upon how marginal that role is. An examination of the role of 
cooperation should inquire into the extent to which the community 
has established communal institutions and customs in furtherance 
of its beliefs.142  
A community’s social legitimacy also should impact the 
remedies it receives.143 The availability of remedies should be 
contingent on either the extent to which the community is 
structurally open through MCB, or whether the community 
complies with the state’s LMRs. If the community does neither, the 
state’s pluralistic obligation is not triggered and the community’s 
                                                            
142 See AMITAI ETZIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMUNITY 134-60 (1993) 
(“[C]ommunities form around institutions such as schools and community 
policing stations.”); David M. Chavis & J.R. Newbrough, The Meaning of 
“Community” in Community Psychology, 14 J. CMTY PSYCHOL. 335, 338 
(2006); Robin S. Golden, Toward a Model of Community Representation for 
Legal Assistance Lawyering: Examining the Role of Legal Assistance Agencies 
in Drug-Related Evictions from Public Housing, 17 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 527, 
530 (1998) (“These institutions represent the efforts of individual neighborhood 
residents to identify and solve their own problems. They are, I contend, the 
voices of the community.”); William Sewell, The Concept(s) of Culture, in 
BEYOND THE CULTURAL TURN: NEW DIRECTIONS IN THE STUDY OF SOCIETY 
AND CULTURE 37, 55-57 (Victoria E. Bonnell and Lynn Hunt eds., 1999). 
143 See supra Part II.B. 
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members should not be entitled to any alternative takings remedies. 
A community ideally satisfies the social legitimacy requirement by 
allowing MCB, and in such cases should be entitled to a remedy 
designed to enable the community’s continued functioning. 
Communities that comply only with state LMRs do not exhibit the 
same level of social legitimacy, and so the state should only be 
required to indirectly assist in their reestablishment. 
The third factor, community strength, recognizes that the 
state’s pluralistic obligation does not require intervention when the 
goal of this obligation—to allow all citizens to live in accordance 
with their values and beliefs—is not in jeopardy.144 The selection 
of remedies, therefore, should depend on the community’s ability 
to continuously realize its conception of the good post-
expropriation without state assistance. Politically and economically 
strong communities are more likely to be able to rehabilitate 
themselves post-expropriation.145 Because weaker communities are 
less able to counter the threat that expropriation poses to their 
realization of the good, the state’s obligation should include a 
remedy that will foster the community’s continued cooperation. 
To summarize, the selection of remedies should primarily 
depend on the three factors discussed in Part II: the role of 
cooperation in the community’s realization of a shared conception 
of the good, the community’s social legitimacy, and the 
community’s political and economic strength. Additionally, the 
scale and scope of the expropriation should be taken into account. 
Fair market value compensation is likely an adequate remedy in 
cases of Isolated takings that are not expected to significantly alter 
the community fabric. The additional remedies of fixed premiums 
and indirect resettlement assistance may be appropriate for Isolated 
and Tipping expropriations to remedy any loss of the affected 
members’ ability to cooperate. These remedies, as well as variable 
premiums, should also be used for certain Clearing expropriations 
                                                            
144 See supra Part II.C.  
145 These politically and economically strong communities are also less 
likely to be the target of condemnation. See supra notes 122–24 and 
accompanying text. Further, even when they become the subject of 
condemnation, these communities are more likely to fend off government 
takings at the outset.   
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where cooperation plays a less central role in the community’s 
realization of its conception of the good, or the community is 
politically or economically strong or does not allow MCB. The 
level of assistance and size of the premiums should also vary 
depending on the extent of the community’s fulfillment of the three 
factors. Finally, direct resettlement should also be available to 
certain communities subject to Tipping and Clearing 
expropriations depending on the interplay of the three factors 
discussed in Part II. For instance, direct resettlement would be 
appropriate for weak, MCB-compliant communities that engage in 
constitutive cooperation.146  
 
IV. COUNTERARGUMENTS ADDRESSED 
 
This Part will address three potential counterarguments to the 
reform proposed in this article: (1) the subjective value argument, 
which questions the need of the state to compensate owners for the 
loss of subjective values embodied in their property rights; (2) the 
anti-commodification argument, which questions the desirability of 
distinct treatment of CICs in takings law, due to concerns about 
placing a price on communality; and (3) the neutrality argument, 
founded on a concern over the state’s equal treatment of similarly 
situated actors and the possible abuse of benefits. These objections 
may explain why, despite the normative appeal of pluralism, 
alternative treatment of certain CICs has not yet been 
implemented. As I explain, however, none of these arguments 
                                                            
146 Even direct resettlement may prove ineffective in certain scenarios, 
however, such as when the geographic location of a community is essential to its 
conception of the good. See, e.g., BRIAN EDWARD BROWN, RELIGION, LAW, AND 
THE LAND: NATIVE AMERICANS AND THE JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF SACRED 
LAND 13 (1999) (“[B]ut if the reserve of their ancestors and the preservation of 
and access to Chota and other village sites of historical and cultural significance 
were dimensions of the religion that the Cherokees sought to protect, the heart of 
their complaint was the notion that the waters and land of the river valley were 
themselves sacred, holy realities that would be destroyed by the impeding 
Tellico project.”). The use of such a remedy should be contingent upon the 
consent of the number of members needed for the community to continue 
realizing its conception of the good, which would vary from case to case. 
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justifies a uniform treatment of residential configurations in 
takings law. 
 
A. Subjective Values Argument 
 
The use of a single comprehensive remedy for all residential 
takings might be justified if differences among configurations are 
seen as dependent merely on owners’ subjective preferences. 
According to this view, an owner’s choice of residential 
configuration at least partially reflects her personal preference for 
particular values or ways of living. While expropriation may cost 
the owner more than just physical property, this additional loss is 
not compensable because of its subjective nature. While courts do 
not reject the possibility that such losses may occur and have 
acknowledged that property owners are not fully compensated in 
such cases, they reject additional compensation on the ground that 
it is too difficult to evaluate subjective losses.147 Property scholar 
Brian Lee goes even further. He recently argued that the market 
value standard almost fully compensates for subjective losses.148 
According to Lee, the subjective losses that the market value 
standard does not cover are idiosyncratic, and there is reason to 
doubt whether people should in fact be compensated for such 
losses at all.149   
                                                            
147 See, e.g., United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 511 
(1979) (“Because of serious practical difficulties in assessing the worth an 
individual places on particular property at a given time, we have recognized the 
need for a relatively objective working rule.”). 
148 Brian A. Lee, Just Undercompensation: The Idiosyncratic Premium in 
Eminent Domain, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 593, 607–17 (2013) (Lee argues that 
owners’ “subjective value” can be divided into several distinct types of values, 
such as sentimental value, alterations to the property made by the owner, 
location benefits, out of pocket expenses, information costs, potential gains from 
trade, and autonomy. Lee concludes that fair market value compensation does 
not neglect entire categories of condemnees’ subjective value in their property—
aside from the value of each condemnee’s own autonomy—but instead provides 
at least partial compensation for a significant amount of that value). 
149 See id. at 616, 635–49. Lee also argues that market value does not 
include the loss of autonomy suffered by property owners as a result of their 
forced evictions. Id. at 615–16. However, this loss, to the extent it exists, is 
shared equally by all property owners who are subject to expropriation, and 
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The subjective nature of these additional losses, however, does 
not justify the existing takings remedy scheme. First, Lee’s core 
principle, that society should not bear the costs of certain 
individuals’ idiosyncratic losses, is of dubious validity. A state’s 
obligation to ensure a pluralistic society may indeed require it to 
take into account, at least to some extent, its citizens’ 
idiosyncrasies.150 The obligation does not demand automatic 
recognition of any and all idiosyncratic values, but does require a 
careful evaluation of the connection between such values and an 
individual’s choice of residential configuration.151 Second, the 
availability of in-kind remedies can overcome the difficulty of 
measuring the monetary value of subjective losses.152  
Finally, changing the treatment CICs receive in takings law is 
justified even accepting Lee’s argument that subjective values are 
for the most part accounted for in a property’s fair market value. 
This is because a property’s fair market value is not always easily 
ascertained and additional compensation through in-kind remedies 
could alleviate this problem. As Lee demonstrates, calculating 
                                                            
therefore, as Lee argues, there is no reason to compensate any individual 
condemnees differently on this basis. Id. at 636–45. 
150 This, I argue, is especially important with respect to cooperation that is 
constitutive of a community’s ability to realize its conception of the good. See 
supra Part II.A. Commitment to foundational pluralism as a source of the state’s 
obligation to recognize differences between residential configurations in takings 
law differs from establishing such a claim on a social capital basis. Justifying 
differential treatment of residential configurations out of a commitment to 
pluralism is not dependent on these configurations’ contributions to the social 
capital of society, but rather on the ability of owners to realize their conceptions 
of the good. Thus, such a justification avoids most concerns regarding the 
contribution of residential communities to social capital. Cf. Stern, supra note 5 
(arguing that residential “micro-institutions”, such as CICs, do play a role in 
increasing or decreasing social capital). 
151 Such recognition should also be supported by autonomy-
enhancing pluralists, who believe that a person’s autonomous choices should be 
respected by the state. See, e.g., Dagan, supra note 8, at xvii; Dagan, supra note 
101, at 1412. Regarding a person’s choice of a specific residential configuration 
as an expression of her autonomy raises questions for Lee as well, since he 
recognizes the loss of autonomy due to expropriation as compensable. See Lee, 
supra note 148, at 615. 
152 See supra Part III.A. 
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takings compensation based on previous transactions involving 
identically configured properties indeed entails an implicit 
assessment of subjective losses, as the other owners would 
presumably have considered such losses when selling.153 However, 
this assumption does not hold if there are few or no transactions 
involving other similarly situated properties.154 Lee’s argument 
against compensating for certain subjective losses calls for 
categorizing properties on the basis of whether there exists a 
sufficiently large market for identically configured properties and 
therefore encounters difficulties when, for example, an entire 
community is uprooted. In-kind remedies that would allow the 
continued existence and functioning of the community may be 
especially appropriate in these circumstances. 
The existing comprehensive takings compensation formula, 
therefore, cannot be justified on the ground that the values 
underlying differences between residential configurations are 
merely subjective in nature. This standard disregards differences 
among residential configurations in a way that violates individual 
owners’ property rights and, equally important, interferes with the 
ability of certain CICs to flourish.155 A person’s choice of 
residential configuration reflects her deeper commitment to certain 
fundamental values by which she desires to live. In a pluralistic 
society, the law should not ignore the different values informing 
such choices, even those which might be described as 
idiosyncratic. 
 
B. Anti-Commodification Concerns 
 
Commodification has become a focal point in delineating 
market boundaries and in the division of labor between the market 
                                                            
153 But see Lee A. Fennell, Just Enough, 113 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 
109, 112 (2013), http://columbialawreview.org/just-enough_fennell/ (“[T]here is 
reason to doubt that typical amounts of sentimental value and other 
individualized costs wind up in FMV.”). 
154 See id. at 113–14 (questioning Lee’s logic even in the context of 
identical properties). 
155 See supra Part I.B. 
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and the state.156 Using several different rationales, anti-
commodification proponents object to substantial permeation of 
market norms into spheres, institutions, and relationships that 
traditionally are not open to sale. The two most prominent of these 
rationales are based upon concerns of corruption of values and 
economic coercion.157 The commodification concern is found in 
                                                            
156 Tsilly Dagan & Talia Fisher, The State and the Market—A Parable: 
On the State’s Commodifying Effects, 3 PUB. REASON 44, 44 (2011). 
157  Michael Sandel first recognized two broad categories of anti-
commodification arguments: corruption and coercion. See Michael Sandel, What 
Money Can’t Buy: The Moral Limits of Markets, in 21 THE TANNER LECTURES 
ON HUMAN VALUES 89, 94–96 (Grethe B. Peterson ed., 2000). The corruption 
rationale essentially accords with a pluralistic understanding of society. As 
Elizabeth argues, “If different spheres of social life, such as the market, the 
family and the state, are structured by norms that express fundamentally 
different ways of valuing people and things, then there can be some ways we 
ought to value people and things that can’t be expressed through market norms.” 
See ANDERSON, supra note 9, at xiii. The corruption rationale has both practical 
and normative aspects. The practical aspect posits that when values are 
cognitively incommensurable, people are unable to make certain value 
comparisons because they have no basis for determining how much of X to give 
up in exchange for Y. In other words, X and Y are measured on different scales, 
frustrating our ability to make any comparison between them. The normative 
aspect suggests that not only is it not practically possible to compare things that 
are evaluated on different scales, but any attempt to do so, in itself, corrupts the 
intrinsic meaning we give to these things, i.e., “certain moral and civic goods are 
diminished or corrupted if bought and sold for money.” Sandel, supra at 122. 
Indeed, such an attempt “points to the degrading effect of market valuation and 
exchange on certain goods and practices.” Id. Out of a commitment to 
foundational pluralism, this understanding assumes the existence of different 
spheres, wherein people are able to use different modes of evaluation.  Given the 
existence of different spheres, valuations or exchanges, metrics from one sphere 
will necessarily invade or crowd out other modes of evaluation or comparison. 
Such an exchange is corrupting when it ignores the differences between these 
spheres of valuation and forces us to value all goods in the same manner.   
 Quite a different rationale for objecting to the adoption of market 
mechanisms in non-market spheres involves the fear that people will be forced 
to act in a way that they naturally oppose. Glenn Cohen splits Sandel’s coercion 
argument into two sub-arguments, which differ in the type of harm caused by 
the transaction that is emphasized.  The first, which Cohen terms the 
“voluntariness” argument, asks whether consent to the transaction was truly 
voluntary given the seller’s socioeconomic status. For instance, the poor may be 
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many areas of research such as inter-personal relationships,158 
personal gestures,159 education,160 health,161 and culture.162 Our 
                                                            
forced to sell their valuable assets, only because they will not be able to resist 
the monetary reward. The second sub-argument Cohen raises, the “access” 
argument, differs from the first one in that it does not examine the seller’s 
condition but rather that of the purchaser.  Here, the focus is on unequal access 
to the goods, given an unfair background distribution of those goods. The 
concern is that only some will be able to afford the good if it is commodified, 
“that surrogacy will be used for the benefit of the rich at the expense of the 
poor.” This is quite a different argument and expands the meaning of coercion to 
encompass the economic improbability of certain individuals purchasing goods. 
Although these two arguments differ from each other, they both are based on the 
existence of fundamental economic inequality in society. For each argument, the 
concern over market expansion into spheres of life generally perceived to be 
outside the reach of the market reflects the will to avoid spreading economic 
inequality into these spheres. See Note, The Price of Everything, the Value of 
Nothing: Reframing the Commodification Debate, 117 HARV. L. REV. 689, 690-
91 (2003).   
158 See, e.g., MARGARET J. RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE 
TROUBLE WITH TRADE IN SEX, CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER THINGS 3–
4, 97–98 (1996). 
159 See, e.g., Nancy Folbre & Julie A. Nelson, For Love or Money—Or 
Both?, 14 J. ECON. PERSPS. 123 (2000); Margaret Jane Radin, Market-
Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1907 (1986); Lee Taft, Apology 
Subverted: The Commodification of Apology, 109 YALE L.J. 1135 (2000). 
160 See, e.g., Rajani Naidoo & Ian Jamieson, Knowledge in the 
Marketplace: The Global Commodification of Teaching and Learning in Higher 
Education, in 16 INTERNATIONALIZING HIGHER EDUCATION: CERC STUDIES IN 
COMPARATIVE EDUCATION 37 (Peter Ninnes & Meeri Hellstén eds., 2005); 
Rajani Naidoo, Repositioning Higher Education as a Global Commodity: 
Opportunities and Challenges for Future Sociology of Education Work, 24 BRIT. 
J. SOC. EDUC. 249 (2003); Anthony R. Welch, For Sale, by Degrees: Overseas 
Students and the Commodification of Higher Education in Australia and the 
United Kingdom, 34 INT’L REV. EDUC. 387, 388 (1988); Hugh Willmott, 
Managing the Academics: Commodification and Control in the Development of 
University Education in the U.K., 48 HUM. RELS. 993 (1995). 
161 See, e.g., Ronald L. Caplan, The Commodification of 
American Health Care, 28 SOC. SCI. & MED. 1139 (1989); Arthur W. Frank, 
What’s Wrong with Medical Consumerism?, in CONSUMING HEALTH: THE 
COMMODIFICATION OF HEALTH CARE 13 (Saras Henderson & Alan R. Petersen 
eds., 2002). 
162 See, e.g., Regina Austin, Kwanzaa and the Commodification of Black 
Culture, in RETHINKING COMMODIFICATION: CASES AND READING IN LAW AND 
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handling of these relationships and institutions should therefore be 
sensitive to commodifying effects, which can harm the meaning 
we attach to them. 
The thrust of the anti-commodification corruption argument is 
that when the government takes an individual’s property for the 
public’s benefit and monetarily compensates the individual, the 
property in question is commodified, since it indicates that the 
property is interchangeable with a fixed amount of money.163 In 
this regard, “[t]he notion of eminent domain constitutionalizes 
fungibility.”164 If we accept the pluralistic conception of property 
ownership—that property ownership can reflect several different 
values (such as community, autonomy, and personhood), then 
treating property and money as interchangeable is particularly 
problematic.  Eminent domain thus commodifies not just the 
physical property taken, but also commodifies and thus corrupts 
the values owners wish to express through it.   
Moreover, according to the anti-commodification argument, 
the corrupting effects of takings are not limited to the specific act 
of condemnation. Current takings remedies, which declare that 
property, any property, is interchangeable with money, affect 
society’s perception of property. Anti-commodification proponents 
argue that it is only reasonable to assume that if the state treats 
property as a commodity, regardless of its meaning to the owner’s 
personhood or identity, the public will view property the same way 
and act accordingly. According to a pluralistic conception of 
property, such an understanding of property is problematic, since it 
robs property of whatever deeper values its owners (and society) 
might attribute to it.  
                                                            
CULTURE 178 (Martha M. Ertman & Joan C. Williams eds., 2005); Bruce 
Prideaux, Commodifying Heritage: Loss of Authenticity and Meaning or an 
Appropriate Response to Difficult Circumstances?, 3 INT’L J. TOURISM SCI. 1 
(2003). 
163 See MARGARET JANE RADIN, REINTERPRETING PROPERTY 136 (1993) 
(“In assuming that compensation is an appropriate corrective measure, that it can 
be ‘just’ or make owners whole, the current idea of eminent domain assumes 
that all property is fungible—that property by nature or by definition consists of 
commodities fully interchangeable with money.”). 
164 Id. 
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By increasing the number of variables to which a government 
should attach value when it expropriates private property, the 
proposed takings regime might at first blush seem to increase the 
commodification of property. But a closer examination of the 
situation reveals that the reform would not exacerbate, but instead 
blunt commodification effects. 
First, establishing a range of remedies beyond fixed monetary 
compensation would allow the state to appropriately tailor the 
remedy to the affected individual or community based on the 
community’s distinct characteristics. The availability of in-kind 
remedies would actually reduce the commodifying effects of 
government takings. By rejecting the premise of market value 
compensation—that all property is interchangeable with money—
and taking into account the different characteristics and underlying 
values of CICs, an alternative remedies scheme would allay 
commodification concerns. While unraveling the relationship 
between money and property would not completely eliminate the 
commodifying effects inherent in government takings, it would 
curtail the corrupting effects of the existing legal regime. 
Nor would compensation for loss of communality exacerbate 
the second concern related to commodification: coercion arising 
from economic inequality. Distinguishing among communities 
involves the use of various compensation mechanisms and other 
remedies to address the additional losses that a community’s 
members might suffer due to expropriation. Some of these 
remedies are likely to take the form of compensation in excess of a 
property’s fair market value, or alternatively, non-monetary 
benefits that may be translated into actual or potential economic 
gains. One could make an anti-commodification argument that 
these “surpluses” will incentivize both property owners and 
expropriating authorities to participate in eminent domain 
proceedings that involve special remedies. A race to the bottom 
may occur where economically disadvantaged communities 
compete with each other to transfer their property to the state in 
exchange for an attractive surplus of monetary compensation. In 
addition, providing remedies that compensate property owners 
beyond market value may also remove the significant, if not 
insurmountable, cognitive barrier that state actors face when they 
seek to condemn properties, and the removal of this barrier could 
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potentially lead to more, and larger, expropriations.165 Providing 
the state with multiple remedies for expropriation—some of which 
exceed the property’s market value—could break this barrier, 
incentivizing the state to further expropriate residential 
communities’ property. Thus, ironically, incorporation of the 
significance of CICs into takings law may lead to more 
expropriation in such communities. Yet, these concerns are also 
mitigated by the expansion of the range of remedies’ and by the 
reforms sensitive to the characteristics of given communities.  
A race to the bottom, however, should occur only when 
property owners can reliably expect to receive surplus 
compensation. Under the proposed reform, each community would 
be granted different, individually-tailored remedies. Thus, a 
community or property owner would have no guarantee of extra 
monetary compensation, alleviating concerns over a race to the 
bottom. Furthermore, the higher cost of implementing these 
tailored remedies should allay concerns that the proposal 
incentivizes the state to more readily expropriate property. As 
discussed in Part III, differential treatment of residential 
communities in takings law entails additional costs that exceed 
those imposed on the state under current law. While these 
additional costs may be justified to fulfill the state’s pluralistic 
obligation, they nevertheless serve as a new barrier to 
expropriation. Therefore, while the proposed reform may break the 
behavioral barrier to expropriations that under-compensation 
creates, a new economic barrier—based on the higher costs of the 
proposed reform’s remedies—should diminish fears of increased 
expropriation.   
                                                            
165 This cognitive barrier may be explained both in behavioral terms and 
in economic terms. Assume that a state is planning to build a hospital and has 
located two potential plots to build on. Plot A serves a residential community 
that we may assume, for the sake of this example, maintains constitutive 
cooperation. Plot B, on the other hand, is home to an abandoned factory. In both 
cases, the market value of the property equals $500,000. The cognitive barrier is 
expected to lead the government actor to prefer to expropriate plot B since full 
compensation will be possible. Although a decision to expropriate plot A would 
also require payment of only $500,000, it would leave the owners 
undercompensated. For such a cognitive barrier, see Uri Gneezy & Aldo 
Rustichini, A Fine is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). 
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C. Maintaining State Neutrality 
 
According to the neutrality argument, the state, within certain 
limits, should remain neutral in regard to how people choose to 
live their lives, including how people decide to own and use their 
property. Consequently, the state should be reluctant to 
compensate differently individuals in various CICs because such 
distinctions might be interpreted as the state favoring one 
residential configuration over another.  
The neutrality argument has deep roots in American political 
tradition, culture, and property law, and so cannot be easily 
dismissed.166 Most proponents of the neutrality argument hold that 
neutrality means the state should not involve itself in subjective or 
idiosyncratic measures of value. Yet establishing a takings remedy 
scheme that redresses additional harms that CICs incur would 
actually preserve state neutrality rather than undermine it. This 
proposal rejects the interpretation of neutrality as a complete 
withdrawal of the state from involvement in the determination of 
ownership forms or from its obligation to allow such forms to 
exist. Instead, neutrality should be reinterpreted as an opportunity 
for the state to fulfill its pluralistic obligation and to allow citizens 
to freely choose their desired property arrangements.  
A government’s attempt to remain neutral by adopting a 
completely passive role may actually disfavor certain conceptions 
of the good by making their pursuit difficult or impossible. Thus, 
in order to fulfill its pluralistic obligation, the state should be 
required to actively ensure the existence and survival of various 
residential configurations. But can a state that actively supports a 
diversity of residential configurations remain neutral? Joseph Raz 
argues that political neutrality is best interpreted as a state’s 
disinclination to either promote one conception of the good or to 
direct a person to choose one conception of the good over 
another.167 Accounting for loss of communality in takings law is 
consistent with both of these interpretations of political neutrality.   
                                                            
166 See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND 
PRACTICE OF EQUALITY 239–40 (2002); RAWLS, supra note 11, at 19–92. 
167 JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREEDOM 114–15 (1986). 
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The proposal offered in this Article would not promote a 
particular conception of the good. If anything, it would push 
against the impression that individualistic residential 
configurations are the only means of achieving the good life. By 
incorporating the distinct characteristics of CICs into takings law, 
the state would actually restore the balance between different 
residential configurations, putting all of them on equal footing. 
Such an approach does not change the likelihood that a person will 
endorse one conception of the good over another. The availability 
of alternative remedies would probably not inordinately increase 
the number of people living in highly cooperative communities as 
living in those communities would still involve significant 
restrictions on individual property rights. Rather, it would promote 
neutrality by removing the structural bias against such 
communities which, under the current scheme, are uniquely at risk 
of under-compensation for community-related losses.  
Finally, the individualistic nature of the existing compensation 
scheme in takings law does not ensure all citizens’ ability to live 
by their values and beliefs. An alternative remedy scheme that 
gives meaning to individuals’ choices of residential configurations 
would promote state neutrality. By disregarding the unique 
characteristics of more cooperative communities, current takings 
law sends a clear message concerning the state’s preference for 
individualistic forms of ownership. This message may have a 
twofold effect on individual owners. First, it may prevent them 
from choosing to reside in CICs in the first place. Second, and 
equally troubling from the standpoint of foundational pluralism, it 
may affect the way in which owners manage these communities, 
threatening the communities’ cooperative nature.168 In order for the 
state to become truly neutral—to “ensure for all persons an equal 
                                                            
168 When the law conceives of property in purely individualistic terms, it 
hinders people’s ability to treat or think of property any differently. Many 
people may be discouraged from trying to live in accordance with views of 
property ownership that are at odds with the monistic individualist 
understanding of property that underlies existing property law. For example, the 
conditions, covenants, and restrictions (CC&Rs) of a CIC may not include any 
demand for sacrifice on behalf of owners for the sake of community, or even 
reciprocal relationship, as such demand may harm the individualistic 
understanding of property ownership.    
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ability to pursue in their lives and promote in their societies any 
ideal of the good of their choosing”169—the law should take into 
account the distinct characteristics of less individualistic forms of 
ownership. The concept of state neutrality thus actually supports 
accounting for communal loss. 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
When the government takes property, individuals who live in 
highly cooperative common interest communities face an 
especially large risk of being short-changed under the existing 
takings scheme, which merely provides them with the fair market 
value of the condemned property. This Article proposes guidelines 
for reforming takings law to provide additional remedies to 
members of these communities to compensate them for their loss 
of communality. The guidelines involve consideration of three 
important factors, namely, the role of cooperation in a 
community’s realization of a conception of the good; the 
community’s social legitimacy as determined primarily by its 
structural openness; and the political and economic strength of the 
community. Alternative remedies may take the form of fixed and 
variable monetary premiums that compensate individuals beyond 
the fair market value of the condemned property, and in-kind 
remedies, such as direct community resettlement and indirect 
assistance with resettlement. 
The proposed guidelines are sensitive to the characteristics of 
each community in question, recognizing that there is great 
variation even among common interest communities. Insofar as we 
accept that an individual’s choice of residential configuration tells 
us something about her values, preferences, and relationships with 
others, we need to incorporate this vision into our laws. The 
proposed guidelines further the state’s obligation to ensure a 
pluralistic society.  
Property law is a social instrument. It should not be detached 
from our social values, but should facilitate individuals’ ability to 
pursue their vision of the good life through cooperation. The law in 
general, and property law in particular, plays a critical role in 
                                                            
169 RAZ, supra note 167, at 115. 
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enabling social diversity. The proposed guidelines contribute to 
that effort. 
 
